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ABSTRACT

Findings in political science suggest that negative emotions play a significant role in our
understanding of 1) which factors affect our political attitudes (e.g. Brader 2006) and 2) which
factors motivate our political behavior (e.g. Lamprianou and Ellinas 2019; Miller 2011). Further,
anger has been established as a negative emotion that significantly affects both political attitudes
(e.g. Brader 2006) and political behavior (e.g. Lamprianou and Ellinas 2019; Miller 2011).
However, there is evidence to suggest that we are motivated differently by three established types
of anger (i.e. personal, empathic, and deontic) (Batson et al. 2007), and so each type of anger
should be examined independently of the others. Thus, the intention of this dissertation, and the
main contribution to the literature on political attitudes and political behavior, is the introduction
of deontic anger, which is a measure of moral outrage that is derived from psychology’s
established deonance theory (e.g. Bucciarelli and Johnson-Laird 2005).
Data for this dissertation is collected from survey experiments administered through the
third-party platforms Mechanical Turk and Lucid. Chapter One gives a brief introduction of
deontic anger. The first empirical chapter, Chapter 2, offers a theoretical and empirical justification
for the inclusion of deontic anger in political science. The chapter’s analyses first examine the
relationship between perceptions of behavior of abuse and deontic anger and then examine the
moderating effect of partisanship on that relationship. The second empirical chapter, Chapter 3,
first examines the relationship between deontic anger and individual attitudes toward immigration
and redistributive policies and then examines the moderating effect of partisanship on that
ii

relationship. The final empirical chapter, Chapter 4, first examines the relationship between
deontic anger and charitable giving and then examines the moderating effect of partisanship on
that relationship. The final chapter of this dissertation addresses potential limitations and explores
avenues for addressing those limitations in future research.
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I: INTRODUCTION

“Politics are not devoid of emotion. Rather, emotions are a core component of citizenship that
shape how people see their political world (Marcus 2002). Emotions have a powerful influence on
political attitudes and behaviors (Brader 2005; Marcus, MacKuen, and Neuman 2011; Nabi 2003)”
– Weeks (2015, p. 699)

Introduction
Successful political leaders persuade through emotional appeals. By inundating political
messages with emotional language, politicians convincingly skew perceptions of the political
world, thereby mobilizing significant portions of the mass public (Schrock, Dowd-Arrow,
Erichsen, Gentile, and Dignam 2017). Such was the case of Adolf Hitler, who “came to power
largely by transforming the population’s emotions of shame into rage at named outsiders (Scheff
and Retzinger 1991)” (Schrock et al. 2017, p. 6). Likewise, following the events of September 11,
2001, President George W. Bush provoked feelings of sympathy, anger, and pride that allowed for
justification of war (Loseke 2009; Schrock et al. 2017). More recently, evidence suggests that
Donald Trump’s successful appeal to the white working-class’s feelings of shame, fear, and
alienation played a significant role in his winning the 2016 presidential election (e.g. Massey 2009;
Vance 2016; Hochschild 2016, Blee 2002). The collective implication of the preceding examples
is that at least some political attitudes and behaviors are affected when certain emotions are
triggered.
1

In the United States, the salience of immigration among Americans has ebbed and flowed
with changes in the immigrant population (Tichenor 2002). Historically, when there is a sudden
and drastic increase in the immigrant population, anti-immigration sentiments among the general
American population have grown as well (Albertson and Kushner Gadarian 2015). Even though
Republicans in particular have highlighted “immigration as a threat to the country” (Albertson
and Kushner Gadarian 2015, p. 26), the issue has crossed party lines. For example, Bill Clinton’s
1995 State of the Union address presented immigrants as a critical threat to American jobs and
physical safety. Likewise, in 2014, Barack Obama “noted that his administration increased the
number of Border Patrol agents to historically high levels and deported 400,000 migrants before
discussing the humanitarian situation, framing the enforcement actions as protection from an
immigration crisis” (Albertson and Kushner Gadarian 2015, p 28).
Concerns regarding immigration, especially illegal immigration, are often framed in
conjunction with economic factors. In the 2016 presidential campaign, Donald Trump also
capitalized on the negative feelings that the white working-class held toward the state of the
economy (Sabet 2016). As Schrock et al. (2017, p. 7) write, “The most basic way Trump
linguistically oriented people toward feeling national shame was by inserting slogans that painted
the U.S. as being in ‘trouble,’ in ‘bad shape,’ and ‘losing.” Evidence suggests that worry over
economic factors, such as unemployment, mobilizes voters (Burden and Wichowsky 2014), and
Donald Trump earned votes by repeatedly insinuating that the Democrats had failed in their
economic policies. For one, he faulted the negative effects of globalization as stemming from Bill
Clinton’s enactment of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). However, Trump
also asserted that the Democrats’ lackadaisical immigration policies were leading to inevitable
2

economic downturns. Essentially, he tied together the issues of economics and immigration by
playing on the public’s feelings of worry about immigrants “taking” American jobs and resources
(Schrock et al. 2017). Donald Trump’s presidential victory was a result of simultaneously
triggering anti-immigration sentiments and feelings of economic discontent.
Despite the negative emotions that some Americans feel toward immigration, findings
suggest that there is overwhelming agreement among Democrats and Republicans as to how
immigrants should be treated once they enter the United States. Specifically, when questioned
about how asylum seeking immigrants should be treated while detained, 82% of surveyed
Americans responded, “it is important to provide safe and sanitary conditions for asylum seekers
once they arrive in the United States” (Pew Research Center 2019)1. In addition, there is broad
consensus on the processing time for detained immigrants, with 89% of Democrats and 83% of
Republicans stating that they believe there should be a greater number of judges handling asylum
cases (Pew Research Center 2019)2. While expressed concern over immigration processing times
could certainly be related to policy preferences, there is also an implicit understanding that a
majority of Americans believe that immigrants detained by the United States should be quickly
released. In other words, partisanship aside, a majority of Americans are able to separate their
preferences for immigration policy as a whole from their preferences for how those immigrants
are treated once they enter the United States.
In 2019 alone, over 600,000 migrants seeking asylum from Central America were detained
at the United States border (Acevedo 2019). However, living conditions for those who have been

1

https://www.people-press.org/2019/08/12/publics-priorities-for-u-s-asylum-policy-more-judges-for-cases-safeconditions-for-migrants/
2
https://www.people-press.org/2019/08/12/publics-priorities-for-u-s-asylum-policy-more-judges-for-cases-safeconditions-for-migrants/
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detained do not always meet American expectations. As reported by USA Today (Collins, Moritz,
and Bureau 2019), the following scene was observed by a reporter who accompanied Vice
President Mike Pence to a Texas detention center:

A reporter traveling with Vice President Mike Pence during a recent tour of an all-male
detention center described a horrendous stench and said nearly 400 men were housed in
sweltering cages so crowded it would have been impossible for all of them to lie down.
The Border Patrol supervisor who gave Pence the tour admitted that the men in custody
hadn’t taken a shower in 10 to 20 days.

Thus, given that a majority of Americans believe that detained immigrants should be
treated humanely, this dissertation explores the following question: Does a perceived violation of
that humane treatment have the potential to trigger emotions that would override existing policy
preferences and the direction of one’s expected political behavior?
Purpose
Findings in political science suggest that negative emotions play a significant role in our
understanding of 1) which factors affect our political attitudes (e.g. Brader 2006) and 2) which
factors motivate our political behavior (e.g. Lamprianou and Ellinas 2019; Miller 2011). Further,
anger has been established as a negative emotion that significantly affects both political attitudes
(e.g. Brader 2006) and political behavior (e.g. Lamprianou and Ellinas 2019; Miller 2011).
However, there is evidence to suggest that we are motivated differently by three established types
of anger (i.e. personal, empathic, and deontic) (Batson et al. 2007), and so each type of anger
should be examined independently of the others. Thus, the intention of this dissertation, and the
main contribution to the literature on political attitudes and political behavior, is the introduction

4

of deontic anger, which is a measure of moral outrage that is derived from psychology’s
established deonance theory (e.g. Bucciarelli and Johnson-Laird 2005).
Deonance theory suggests that when we observe that a third-party3 has been victimized by
being treated inhumanely (i.e. unfairly), we are motivated to reestablish our violated sense of
fairness. When we observe a violation of fairness in the form of abuse, we experience a deontic
reaction (Folger 2001) in the form of a moral emotion termed deontic anger (i.e. moral outrage).
Deontic anger then influences our behavioral choices in such a way that we are willing to engage
in actions that we believe will restore justice. By testing deontic anger as an independent entity we
will further our understanding of how our sense of morality affects our emotions and our
subsequent political attitudes and political behavior.
In short, this dissertation contributes to the literature on political attitudes and political
behavior in the following ways: 1) by establishing the place of deontic anger in political science
literature, 2) by examining the relationship between deontic anger and political attitudes toward
both immigration and redistribution, and 3) by examining the relationship between deontic anger
and the political behavior of making charitable donations.
Filling the Gap in the Literature
To date, Moral Foundations Theory (MFT) (e.g. Graham, Haidt, and Nosek, 2009; Koleva,
Graham, Iyer, Ditto and Haidt 2012; Weber and Federico 2013) has been heavily utilized to explain
variation in political attitudes. MFT suggests that our political attitudes are derived from a set of

3

“Third parties are those who are neither the target of an injustice nor the perpetrator of the act. They include
members of the general public, investors, customers, government officials, colleagues, managers and
subordinates, or any party who observes or learns about an act of injustice perpetrated against another person or
group. Although third parties might not observe the unjust action first hand, our presumption is that they must be
sufficiently aware of the event for it to trigger a response” (O’Reilly and Aquino 2011, p. 526).

5

five moral intuitions4, and those moral intuitions lead to an instantaneous emotional reaction to
perceived instances of injustice. In other words, MFT suggests that our political attitudes are the
result of an emotional response rather than calculated reasoning. However, even though MFT has
offered a glimpse of the effects of some specific moral emotions, the theory falls short in ways that
this dissertation seeks to address.
First, MFT fails to fully consider the moral emotion anger. This is significant because
evidence suggests that anger can be subcategorized as personal, empathic, or deontic (Batson et
al. 2007), meaning not all anger is to be considered moral as assumed by MFT. As such, there is
potential variation in how different types of anger affect the direction and the strength of political
attitudes. Second, MFT does not consider the effects of moral emotions on behavioral outcomes.
Given the theoretical evidence that different types of anger motivate different behavioral outcomes
(e.g. Hutcherson and Gross 2011; Batson et al. 2007; Folger 2001), this dissertation parses out
“true” moral anger and examines the relationship between that moral anger and political behavior.
Deontic Anger in Political Science
Deontic anger is similar to MFT in that the underlying premise is moral intuition5.
Essentially, an individual instantaneously experiences a moral emotion in response to a perceived
violation of a societal norm. However, unlike the moral emotions previously identified in MFT,
deontic anger is an entirely unselfish emotion that is specific to the observation of a third-party
transgression. Thus, the theoretical underpinnings of deontic anger “fit” within established

4

The five sets of moral intuitions are Harm/Care, Fairness/Reciprocity, Ingroup/Loyalty, Authority/Respect, and
Purity/Sanctity
5
Haidt (2001, p.818) defines moral intuition as: “The sudden appearance in consciousness of a moral judgment,
including an affective valence (good-bad, like-dislike), without any conscious awareness of having gone through
steps of searching, weighing evidence, or inferring a conclusion.”

6

political science literature, while offering a contribution by isolating the attitudinal and behavioral
effects of an unexplored moral emotion.
Preview of Empirical Chapters
To examine the effects of deontic anger on both political attitudes and political behavior,
the chapters of this dissertation proceed in the following way. Chapter 2, the first empirical chapter,
establishes the place of deontic anger in political science literature by testing the extent to which
a perceived moral violation of abusive behavior toward immigrants results in deontic anger.
Chapter 3, the second empirical chapter, tests the relationship between deontic anger and
individual attitudes toward both immigration and redistribution. Chapter 4, the third empirical
chapter, tests the relationship between deontic anger and specific political behavior. Chapter 5
concludes this dissertation by identifying avenues for future research.

7

II. DEONTIC ANGER IN POLITICAL SCIENCE
Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to establish deontic anger’s place in the political science
literature and to test the established relationship between third-party observations of abuse and
reported feelings of deontic anger. As such, this chapter will proceed by first reviewing literature
that is relevant to studies of negative emotions, especially emphasizing the emotion anger. This
will be followed by an explanation of the general premise of deontic anger, as well as clarification
of how deontic anger fits within and contributes to existing political science literature. This chapter
will conclude with an empirical analysis testing the relationship between the perceived violation
of fairness in relation to observed abuse and deontic anger. 6
Anger as a Discrete Emotion
Evidence supports the mediating role of discrete emotions in directing individual policy
preferences (e.g. Brader 2006) and in motivating political behavior (e.g. Lamprianou and Ellinas
2019; Miller 2011). As noted by Gross (2008, p. 169), “a growing body of research demonstrates
that emotions can play a crucial role in how citizens process political information and arrive at
political judgments.” Rooted in appraisal theory, the discrete approach to studies of emotions

6

According to appraisal theory, our individual interpretation of a given situation determines our emotions
associated with that situation. (e.g., Arnold, 1960; Frijda, 1986; Izard, 1977; Lazarus, 1991; Ortony et al., 1988;
Plutchik, 1980; Roseman, 1991)
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assumes that each emotion is unique, and, thus, studies utilizing the discrete approach treat each
emotion as distinct (Miller 2011). In other words, unlike dimensional models, which broadly
categorize emotions across a few dimensions, the discrete approach does not assume that unique
emotions “fit” under umbrellas. To explore the effects of emotions on political attitudes and
political behavior, the analysis in this dissertation follows the assumptions of the discrete approach.
More specifically, an underlying assumption of this dissertation is that the emotion anger must be
parsed apart in order to better understand the emotion’s causes and effects.
The Effect of Negative Emotions
A premise of this dissertation is to examine the extent to which deontic anger, a negative
emotion, affects both political attitudes and political behavior. As noted in extant literature,
negative emotions do play a significant role in directing individuals’ support for specific policies
(Leiserowitz 2006; Myers, Nisbet, Maibach, and Leiserowitz 2012). This is not to say that positive
emotions have no effect. However, as Albertson and Kushner Gadarian (2015, p. 9) note,
“individuals do not merely passively experience emotions; they also try to regulate those emotions
by increasing pleasant emotions and decreasing unpleasant ones like anxiety” (Gross 2009; Gross
and Thompson 2009). In other words, negative emotions have the potential to motivate preferences
and behavior in ways that positive emotions do not.
Studies do support a positive relationship between an individuals’ negative emotions and
attitudes (e.g. Brader 2006) and behavior (e.g. Lamprianou and Ellinas 2019; Miller 2011);
however, not all negative emotions have equal effects. Current studies on political attitudes and
political behavior treat the emotion anger in a generic manner. However, as will be explained,
anger is an especially powerful emotion (e.g. Valentino et al. 2011) that deserves special
consideration and thorough examination.
9

The Motivating Power of Anger
In terms of motivating emotions, evidence suggests that anger may have the greatest effect
(Valentino et al. 2011). This sentiment is echoed by scholars such as Weber (2013), Lerner and
Tiedens (2006), and C. Harmon-Jones et al. (2011). Valentino et al. (2011) write that “anger
powerfully motivates” (p. 164) and that it influences “some people to participate in ways that they
might ordinarily not – even if they have the ability and opportunity to do so” (p. 168). When people
experience feelings of anger, they are motivated to act in a way that reconciles the discomfort
caused by the negative emotion (Albertson and Kushner Gadarian 2015).
While other negative emotions are more likely to lead someone to avoid a given situation
(Harmon-Jones and Allen 1998; Roseman, Wiest, and Swartz 1994), “anger tends to promote
approach tendencies,” meaning an individual is likely to act in response to feeling angry
(Hutcherson and Gross 2011, p. 720). Further, “Anger results in higher energy expenditure,
evidenced by greater autonomic arousal and behavioral activation7, and a greater willingness to
take risks8” (Hutcherson and Gross 2011, p. 720). However, the type of risk (i.e. behavior) that is
undertaken is likely a by-product of whether the offense leading to anger is considered a threat to
“self” (Hutcherson and Gross 2011; de Quervain et al. 2004; O’Gorman, Wilson, and Miller 2005).
In other words, the specific behavioral response that an angry individual chooses is theoretically
related to the type of anger that is being experienced.

7
8

Levenson, Ekman, and Firesen 1990
Lerner and Keltner 2001; Lerner and Tiedens 2006
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Differentiating Anger
Evidence suggests that individuals are motivated differently by three established types of
anger: personal, empathic, and deontic (Batson et al. 2007). A central premise of this dissertation
is to explore the extent to which deontic anger motivates political attitudes and political behavior.
However, in order for the expected findings of the forthcoming empirical analysis to have sound
theoretical support, the three types of anger must be clearly differentiated.
Personal Anger
Personal anger is anger in response to the potential to one’s self being harmed or because
personal interests have been thwarted in some way (Batson et al. 2007). When the self is
threatened, a provoked anger response leads to a greater likelihood that the offended person will
seek to punish the offender (de Quervain et al. 2004; O’Gorman, Wilson, and Miller 2005). Batson,
Chao, and Givens (2008) and Batson et al. (2007) concur that, “Participants report greater anger
when a moral offense is self-relevant than when it is not” (Hutcherson and Gross 2011, p. 725).
Further, someone’s response to feeling personal anger is likely to be retaliatory or punishing in
nature, as this type of response is intended to protect that person from the intended harm.
Empathic Anger
Contrary to personal anger, empathic anger is an anger response to the treatment of a thirdparty. Specifically, empathic anger “is expected when the subject perceived third persons to be
responsible for the distress of others9” (Montada and Schneider 1989, p. 314). Literature on
empathic anger suggests that when individuals perceive that someone that they care for has been

9

Hoffman 2000
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harmed in some way, or that the interests of the person for whom they care have been thwarted,
they experience anger on behalf of that person (Batson et al. 2007).
Batson et al. (2007) compare and contrast personal anger and empathic anger in the
following ways. When we feel empathic anger, the expected response is like that of personal anger.
Essentially, we are motivated to punish or retaliate in response to an offensive behavior. In contrast
to personal anger, empathic anger is not motivated solely by self-interest; however, the anger is
not generalized beyond the specific instance. So, like the response to personal anger, the motivated
behavior to retaliate or punish only serves to help a targeted individual. This is not to say that
someone who is acting out of empathic anger does not feel empathy toward others who have had
a similarly negative experience, but the specific motivation of empathic anger is not rectification
on behalf of a larger, generalized group. Like personal anger, empathic anger is marked by
selfishness in that the desired outcome is specific to either one’s self or a targeted individual. In
both cases, the motivated behavior is likely either retaliation or punishment, as neither case aims
to act on behalf of the greater good.
Given that empathic anger is rooted in concern for a third-party, there are those who would
confuse empathic anger with what is termed moral outrage10. In fact, some studies on human
altruism have concluded that the time, energy, and potential physical risks associated with
punishing third-party violations means that retaliation on behalf of another should be considered
“moral” (e.g. Fehr and Fischbacher 2004; Nelissen and Zeelenberg 2009). However, Batson et al.
(2007, p. 1273) differentiate moral anger as follows:

10

Moral outrage is anger resulting from “the perception that a moral standard - usually a standard of fairness or
justice - has been violated” (Batson et al. 2007, p 1272)

12

Personal anger at being treated unfairly should probably not be considered a moral emotion
or a source of moral motivation. It may motivate action described as moral (e.g. punishing
the harm-doer), but the goal is not to restore fairness so much as to get revenge or protect
one’s personal interests.

In the cited passage, Batson et al. (2007) reference personal anger. However, because the
expected behavioral response to empathic anger is like that of personal anger, the differentiation
is theoretically generalizable. Essentially, unless the behavioral goal is to restore fairness, the anger
response should not be considered “moral.”
Deontic Anger
Moral anger as defined by Batson et al. (2007) is also deemed deontic anger, which is the
main variable of interest in this dissertation. While empathic anger leads to seeking revenge for a
specific individual, moral outrage (i.e. moral anger) seeks to restore fairness associated with
societal norms.
The variable deontic anger is derived from deonance theory (Bucciarelli and Johnson-Laird
2005). Taken from the field of psychology, deonance concerns “what one ought to do, may do,
and ought not to do” (Bucciarelli and Johnson-Laird 2005, p. 159). Essentially, deonance theory
asserts that our behavior is guided by deontic principles which “concern what is obligatory,
permissible, and impermissible. [They]11 lie at the heart of human social relations, and underlie all
ethical, legal, and religious systems” (Bucciarelli and Johnson-Laird 2005, p. 159). Deonance
theory dictates that people seek out and uphold fairness simply because doing so is “right” (Beugre
2010). In other words, “People value justice simply because it is moral” (Colquitt and Greenberg
2001, p. 21). Deonance theory is similar to the principle of altruism in that a person’s behavioral

11

deontic principles
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motivation is the well-being of others; it differs in that there is no concern for the fairness of “self.”
As indicated by the tenets of bounded autonomy and the human covenant (Folger 1998), concerns
for personal freedom and fairness hold only so long as the freedom and fairness of others are not
violated.
Bounded Autonomy
Bounded autonomy (Folger 1998) outlines our personal constraints of freedom.
Essentially, bounded autonomy states that we are free in the sense that we may make decisions for
ourselves, but we are bounded in the sense that we are not free to encroach on the freedom of
others. In the example noted by Beugre (2010, p. 536), “I am a free person but my freedom ends
where my fellows’ freedom starts. At work, I am free to take a break, but I am not free to force
others to take a break.” In terms of deonance theory, we may choose to act or not act on the
freedoms available to us; however, we cannot morally coerce others to act on those same available
freedoms. To coerce others to act in accordance with our preferences violates the sense of fairness
that underlies deonance theory and is counter to the deontic principles explained below.
The Human Covenant and Deontic Principles
The human covenant (Folger 1998) is comprised of the following moral contracts: “First,
one should treat a fellow human being with respect and dignity. Second, one should react
negatively when a fellow human is being mistreated” (Beugre 2010, p. 536). Essentially, we are
morally obligated to treat others fairly, and when we witness the unfair treatment of another person,
we are morally obligated to respond. The specific response to the observation of unfair treatment
is guided by deontic principles.

14

“Deontic principles refer to the set of values and beliefs related to fairness as moral
obligation. These principles hold that fairness is an end in itself; people should be outraged when
fairness is violated. A central tenant of the deonance theory of justice is the sense of duty. Acting
fairly toward others is seen as a duty one must perform. A deontic response is then an action or
reaction that uses deontic principles as guidelines” (Beugre 2010, p. 536-537). In short, when a
third-party witnesses a deviation from the moral imperatives of justice and fair treatment (e.g.
abusive supervisor in the workplace), they feel moral outrage or anger (i.e. deontic anger) (Folger
2001; Folger and Cropanzano 2010). At their core, deontic principles serve to regulate how we
treat others by drawing on our sense of moral obligation to uphold fairness. When the principles
of fairness are violated, we experience an emotional response that is deontic anger.
Deontic Anger as Moral Outrage
Given the explanation of deontic anger and deonance theory, deontic anger is rightfully
differentiated from both personal anger and empathic anger.
First, deontic anger stems from the perception that a third-party group has been treated
unfairly. Contrary to personal anger, deontic anger is not directly connected to the “self.” This is
not to say that the person experiencing the anger may not be directly affected in some way.
However, deontic anger arises when the perception is that a generalized third-party group has been
offended, regardless of how the action affects the person experiencing anger. In short, regardless
of personal connection, deontic anger (i.e. moral outrage) is experienced without concern for the
“self” (O’Mara, Jackson, Batson, Gaertner 2011).
Likewise, unlike empathic anger, someone does not need to be personally connected to a
victim of moral injustice in order for deontic anger to occur. This is not to say that the person
15

experiencing deontic anger does not identify at all with a victim of moral injustice. In fact, there
is some evidence to suggest that there is a positive relationship between the likelihood that the
person who is angry about the unfair treatment of a third-party shares some identity with the victim
(e.g. Doosje et al. 1998; Gordijn et al. 2006; Gordign, Wigboldus, and Yzerbyt 2001; Dumont et
al. 2003, etc.). However, identification with a victimized group is not a prerequisite to deontic
anger. Again, the underlying premise of deontic anger is the violation of moral beliefs that are
established by the societal norm of fairness (O’Mara et al. 2011).
In both premise and behavior, deontic anger epitomizes moral outrage as defined by Batson
et al. (2007). While someone experiencing personal anger or empathic anger is moved by personal
offense, someone experiencing deontic anger is moved by the violation of a moral standard. As
different types of anger are elicited by different violations, a logical conclusion is “these two
different forms of anger should, in turn, result in different action tendencies. Moral outrage should
produce motivation to reestablish the moral standard; personal anger, the motivation to strike back
at the harm doer, seeking revenge” (O’Mara et al. 2011, p. 174).
Moral Foundations Theory
Extant literature on deontic anger has, to date, been largely limited to studies in business
literature (e.g. Priesemuth and Schminke 2017). However, the theoretical underpinnings of deontic
anger closely parallel some components of Moral Foundations Theory (MFT), which has widely
been utilized to explain our understanding of political attitudes (Graham, Haidt, and Nosek, 2009;
Koleva, Graham, Iyer, Ditto and Haidt 2012; Weber and Federico 2013; Kertzer et al. 2014).

16

MFT employs five12 sets of innate (Haidt and Joseph 2008) moral intuitions to explain
individual variation in moral judgments (e.g. Graham, Haidt, and Nosek 2009; Haidt and Graham
2007; Haidt and C. Joseph 2004). Specifically, “moral foundation theory posits that specific moral
transgressions elicit specific moral emotions” (Landmann and Hess 2017, p. 1). In other words,
when an individual perceives that a moral rule has been violated in some way, a specific moral
emotion related to the type of moral violation is triggered (Landmann and Hess 2017). For
example, if a societal norm has established that mistreating children is a violation of a moral rule,
then someone who observes the mistreatment of a child should experience compassion in response
to the violation. Likewise, “fairness violations should elicit anger, authority violations should elicit
resentment, loyalty violations should elicit rage and purity violations should elicit disgust”
(Landmann and Hess 2017, p. 2).
Deontic Anger in Political Science
Given the theoretical similarities between deontic anger and Moral Foundations Theory
(MFT), there is sufficient reason to believe that deontic anger is applicable to behavioral studies
in political science. Essentially, both are the result of moral intuition, or an emotional response
that is instantaneous rather than a product of moral reasoning (Haidt 2001; Folger 1998, 2001).
Likewise, in line with a basic premise of the fairness/reciprocity foundation of MFT (Graham,
Haidt, and Nosek, 2009; Koleva, Graham, Iyer, Ditto and Haidt 2012; Weber and Federico 2013;
Kertzer et al. 2014), deontic anger is a moral emotion that is experienced in response to observed
unfairness (Folger 2001; Folger and Cropanzano 2010). Further, the deontic reaction associated
with deontic anger, to restore justice, is similar in characteristics to MFT’s harm/care foundation

12

The five sets of moral intuitions are Harm/Care, Fairness/Reciprocity, Ingroup/Loyalty, Authority/Respect, and
Purity/Sanctity
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(Graham, Haidt, and Nosek 2009; Koleva, Graham, Iyer, Ditto, and Haidt 2012; Weber and
Federico 2013; Kertzer et al. 2014). This specific moral emotion is shown in the business literature
to occur under the observation of abuse (Priesemuth and Schminke 2017), and the harm/care
foundation says that people should not be treated in a way that is physically or emotionally abusive
(Graham, Haidt, and Nosek, 2009; Koleva, Graham, Iyer, Ditto and Haidt 2012; Weber and
Federico 2013; Kertzer et al. 2014), However, the basic premise and potential for a reaction
designated by one of the foundations is where the similarities end.
In MFT literature, anger is generalized. However, as previously explained, even if the
motivation for the anger is unfairness, the exact anger response is contextual (Batson et al. 2007).
Theoretically, as explained by Batson et al. (2007), if the perception is that one’s self is at risk of
harm, an anger response would be categorized as personal, and the behavioral response would
likely be retaliation or punishment of the transgressor. Likewise, if the perception is that a cared
for third-party has been harmed or thwarted in some way, an anger response would be categorized
as empathic, and - again - the behavioral response would likely be retaliation or punishment of the
transgressor. On the other hand, if the anger response is a result of harm against a third-party, with
the underlying premise being a violation of the societal norm of fairness, the anger response is
categorized as deontic, and the behavioral response is to act in a way that restores that fairness.
Given the reviewed literature, MFT’s premise that we can generalize anger as a response
to unfairness is flawed. There are theoretical differences between the three types of anger that
sufficiently require a parsing out of causation and the subsequent reaction. In terms of political
attitudes and behavior, if we fail to consider the three types of anger in isolation, then we cannot
accurately predict how individuals will respond to policies or governmental actions that are
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perceived as unfair. Since personal and empathic anger have been explored in extant literature,
this dissertation focuses specifically on deontic anger.
Societal Norms and Perceptions of Fairness
The violation of a societal norm is such a central tenet of deontic anger that a brief
explanation of norms is required. Essentially, society operates under a system of “norms,” or “a
rule or principle that specifies actions which are required, permissible or forbidden independently
of any legal or social institution” (Haidt and Joseph 2008, p. 2). Further, “quite simply, people
expect others to act in certain ways and not in others, and they care about whether or not others
are following these norms” (Haidt and Joseph 2008, p. 5). “Norms” are a set of understood rules
by which members of society choose to abide by and enforce. Some of these rules could be
generally changed based on individual preferences. However, others are considered moral rules;
they “are those related to justice, rights, and harm/welfare (e.g., don’t hit, cheat, or steal), and they
can’t be changed by consensus because doing so would create new classes of victims” (Haidt and
Joseph 2008, p. 5).
In short, deontic anger is similar to the harm/care foundation of MFT in that it stems from
perceptions of unfairness. However, deontic anger is entirely unselfish, what one might consider
an extension of altruism. The concerns as identified by Folger’s (1998, 2001) theory of deontic
justice are 1) for the well-being of a victimized third-party, without thought for oneself, and 2) a
need to reestablish the societal norm of fairness that has been violated. The sole intention of deontic
anger is to do “what one ought to do” (Bucciarelli and Johnson-Laird 2005) simply because doing
so is “right.”

19

Deontic Reaction to Immigrant Detainment
Between Democrats and Republicans, the issue of illegal immigration is often divisive.
Take, for example, the partisan stance during the presidential election in 2016. A central premise
of Republican candidate Donald Trump’s campaign was that there was an immigration crisis at
the southern United States border. He emphasized the negative effects of illegal immigration,
focusing on illegal immigrants crossing the border and “taking” American jobs and resources
(Schrock et al. 2017). In fact, Trump infamously promised that “We will build a great wall along
the southern border”13 to prevent illegal immigrants from crossing into the United States - a
promise that essentially became a slogan for both his campaign and subsequent presidency. On
the other hand, Democratic candidate Hillary Clinton campaigned with promises of immigration
reform, with an emphasis on promoting naturalization and integrating immigrants into American
society.14
On some issues of immigration, however, there is stronger bipartisan agreement. While
Democrats and Republicans may not agree on immigration policy as a whole, they do generally
agree that immigrants themselves should be treated humanely. In the Pew Research Center
survey15 that was cited in the introductory chapter, we see that, at least in the case of asylum
seeking immigrants, a majority of respondents, regardless of partisanship16, support safe and
sanitary detainment conditions. Interestingly, in the same poll, the same respondents had a much
clearer partisan divide on other immigration questions. For example, when asked whether the

13

https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-donald-trump-immigration-speech-transcript-20160831-snaphtmlstory.html
14
https://www.hillaryclinton.com/issues/immigration-reform/
15
https://www.people-press.org/2019/08/12/publics-priorities-for-u-s-asylum-policy-more-judges-for-cases-safeconditions-for-migrants/
16
73% of Republican respondents and 91% of Democratic respondents said that “Provide safe and sanitary
conditions for asylum seekers” was either Very Important or Somewhat Important
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United States should “reduce the number of people coming to the U.S. to seek asylum,” 90% of
Republican respondents answered that this was either very important or somewhat important, as
opposed to 61% of Democratic respondents. The implication of the collective poll results is that
supporting more stringent controls on immigration does not translate to seeing the inhumane
treatment of those immigrants as permissible. A preference for specific immigration policies does
not necessarily override our belief that people should be treated in a certain way.
If we consider deonance theory (e.g. Bucciarelli and Johnson-Laird 2005), a plausible
explanation for bipartisan support for the treatment of the asylum seeking immigrants is that a
societal norm dictates that we treat people fairly. Essentially, we are largely able to separate a
policy from a person, and we expect that, generally speaking, people should not be treated in a
way that we would consider abusive. The question asked in the cited poll is normative, as in what
should the conditions for asylum seeking detainees be like. The respondents were simply
expressing their preference for the treatment of these immigrants, and, considering the number of
both Democrats and Republicans that answered that “safe and sanitary conditions” were either
Very Important or Somewhat Important, a reasonable assumption is that the treatment of the
immigrants is a matter of fairness. In other words, preference for overall immigration policy aside,
respondents answered the survey question in a way that supports the implicit belief in a societal
norm of fair treatment.
Following the assumption that expects detained immigrants to be treated fairly, deonance
theory (e.g. Bucciarelli and Johnson-Laird 2005) and Folger’s (1998, 2001) theory of deontic
justice suggests that we should explore the response when that expectation is not met.
Theoretically, because treating an immigrant unfairly violates the societal norm of fairness, a thirdparty who observes the violation is expected to experience a deontic reaction in the form of deontic
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anger (Folger 2001). Literature on organizational justice (O’Reilly, Aquino, and Skarlicki 2016)
further supports the proposed relationship between the violation of fairness and deontic anger.
Interpersonal Justice
Organizational justice is made up of distributive17, procedural18, and interpersonal justice.
While each type of justice has the potential to result in a deontic reaction (Folger 2001),
interpersonal justice violations are most likely to provoke moral anger (i.e. deontic anger). This is
because, of the three types of justice, interpersonal alone refers to the specific treatment of a thirdparty individual. Essentially, interpersonal justice requires that people are treated fairly, with
politeness and respect. When a third-party perceives that an individual has not been treated with
politeness and respect, the ensuing response does, in fact, follow Folger’s (1998, 2001) model of
deontic justice. When the observer perceives that the violation is morally wrong, the subsequent
response is deontic anger.
Evidence supports the relationship between the violation of the societal norm of fairness
and deontic anger. In an individuals’ observations of interpersonal interactions, they expect that
people will be treated fairly (e.g. with respect) and when they are not treated fairly, they experience
deontic anger. Considering the aforementioned expectation of fair treatment of detained
immigrants in the United States, coupled with present findings on deontic anger, I posit the
following hypothesis:

17

Concerned with individuals’ rights to receive what is fairly owed to them (Adams 1965; Leventhal 1976)
Concerned with having a voice in the decision-making process and the fair application of allocation and processrelated rules (Leventhal 1980; Thibault and Walker 1975)

18

22

H1: There is a direct and positive relationship between the perception of observed behavior as
abusive and deontic anger.
Perception of
observed
behavior

Deontic Anger

The Moderating Effect of Partisanship
Even though a relatively high percentage of Democrats and Republicans answered that
creating sanitary and safe conditions for the detained immigrants was either Very Important or
Somewhat Important, there was still some partisan division.19 Specifically, while 71% of
Democratic respondents answered that the issue was Very Important, only 32% of Republican
respondents answered the same way. The answer that the issue was Somewhat Important was less
divided by partisanship, with 20% of Democratic respondents and 41% of Republican respondents
choosing this answer. As previously explained, the plausible assumption is that the percentage who
did answer Very Important or Somewhat Important did so in recognition of the societal norm of
fairness. However, the variation by party identification suggests that partisanship is likely to have
a moderating effect on the relationship between a third-party observation of immigrant
mistreatment and reported deontic anger.
Partisanship as a heuristic
Deontic anger is a moral intuition (e.g. O’Reilly and Aquino 2011), meaning it is a moral
judgment that is instantaneous rather than carefully reasoned (Haidt 2001). To arrive at a decision
without calculated reasoning, extant literature suggests that people often rely on heuristics, or
“cognitive short cuts that facilitate ‘fast and frugal ways of thinking’” (O’Reilly, Aquino, and

19

https://www.people-press.org/2019/08/12/publics-priorities-for-u-s-asylum-policy-more-judges-for-cases-safeconditions-for-migrants/
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Skarlicki 2015, p. 173). Evidence suggests heuristics heavily depend on our social identities
(Aquino and Reed 2002). A social identity is defined as a person’s sense of who they are based on
their group membership(s) (Tajfel 1978), and each person has the capacity to have multiple social
identities (Aquino and Reed 2002). Our collection of social identities is known as our socialschema (Markus 1977), which serves to organize our social identities. Further, in the context of a
given situation, any of our social identities can be activated (Forehand et al., in press). Essentially,
when we are required to make a quick decision, but have limited information, our cognitive
shortcut draws from the social identity that is most contextual or situationally relevant (e.g. Aquino
and Reed 2002).
We are capable of possessing a myriad of social identities. However, Leeper and Slothus
(2014) argue that political parties are crucial in that they provide both shortcuts and attachment,
and evidence suggests that the strength of partisanship as a social identification is comparable to
individual identification with religion, social class or ethnicity (Green et al. 2002). In fact, Mason
and Wronski (2018, p. 259-260) find that “partisan identities are social and visceral, and they work
together with other social identities to drive political judgment.” In other words, when a decision
has political implications and we must make that decision quickly, we are likely to at least
somewhat rely on how we identify politically.
As stated in the first hypothesis, there is an expected relationship between a third-party’s
observation of immigrant mistreatment and deontic anger. However, what cannot be overlooked
is that immigration has distinct partisan implications. By and large, Republicans have significantly
more conservative attitudes toward immigration than Democrats. In a 2019 poll conducted by Pew
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Research Center20, respondents answered questions pertaining to their preferences on current
immigration issues in the United States. On measuring partisan preferences for an increase in
security along the U.S.-Mexico border and increasing deportations of illegal immigrants,
significantly more Republican respondents than Democratic respondents answered that the issue
was Very or Somewhat important. Conversely, on the questions measuring partisan preferences for
establishing a legalization path for illegal immigrants who are already here and taking in refugees,
significantly more Democratic respondents than Republican respondents answered that these
issues were either Very or Somewhat important.
The quick moral judgment that results in deontic anger inevitably requires the use of
heuristics. Essentially, because there is not time for moral reasoning, someone who observes the
mistreatment of a third-party will rely, in part, on their social-schema to determine the appropriate
emotional response. Even if observing an immigrant being mistreated leads to deontic anger as
expected, the partisan association with immigration as a whole is likely to activate the political
social identity. Thus, depending on how strongly the observer identifies with a political party,
partisanship will inevitably play a moderating role in the deontic reaction of deontic anger. As
such, I posit the following hypotheses:
H2: Partisanship moderates the relationship between the perception of observed behavior as
abuse and deontic anger.
Partisanship
Perception of
observed
behavior

Deontic Anger
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https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/11/12/americans-immigration-policy-priorities-divisionsbetween-and-within-the-two-parties/
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Methodology
A survey experiment examines the positive relationship between observed abusive
behavior and deontic anger. A survey was chosen as this is the established methodology in political
science for measuring emotional responses (e.g. Gross 2008) and in business literature for
measuring deontic anger (e.g. Priesemuth and Schminke 2019). As with any methodology, there
are some limitations. For one, this survey experiment consists of a cross-sectional analysis,
meaning individual preferences are only considered at one point in time. In other words, this study
does not have access to information that a time-series analysis would offer, to see if preferences
change over time. Additionally, this study does not have the in-depth perspective that would be
available through the use of interviews. On the other hand, because of the large sample size, a
survey experiment offers more potential for generalizability, and so this methodology is adequate
for this dissertation.
Survey Design
Data for the analysis comes from an independent survey experiment. The survey consists
of four treatment conditions and one control condition. To ensure even distribution, the dispersion
of the treatment and control conditions for the survey is randomized among respondents.
Respondents who received a treatment condition were first shown an episodic frame, followed by
questions pertaining to that specific frame.
Episodic frames in a survey experiment are an established methodology for examining
emotional reactions (e.g. Gross 2008). Iyengar (1991) explains the expected effect of using
episodic frames. According to Iyengar (1991), the emotional response evoked by an episodic frame
is likely due to a sense of disconnectedness to the bigger picture that is created by focusing on an
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isolated instance rather than the problem as a whole. In fact, even when presented with a “steady
stream of episodic frames” depicting the same problem, the viewing audience generally fails to
make connections, instead viewing each frame as an isolated event (Gross 2008). Additionally,
Iyengar (1991, p. 136) notes that the use of episodic frames “encourages a ‘moralized’
understanding of political problems by presenting recurring problems as discrete instances” (Gross
2008, p. 171). In other words, the focus on isolated events promotes a sense of personal, as opposed
to societal responsibility for the presented issue. As a central premise of this study is to measure
individual deontic anger in response to an isolated instance, episodic frames are the most
appropriate methodology.
The overall purpose of the survey is to measure the relationship between deontic anger and
individual attitudes toward both immigration and redistributive policies. The intention of the
control condition is to measure those attitudes in the absence of a deontic reaction. Because the
purpose of this chapter to establish the validity of deontic anger in political science, only the data
collected from the treatment conditions will be utilized in this chapter. Likewise, only the survey
questions that pertain to the analysis in this chapter are explained. Variables that are omitted from
this analysis will be explained in Chapter 3.
The survey was administered through the third-party platform, Lucid21 in March of 2020.
The total number of responses was 1,279. The episodic frames for each of the four treatment
conditions consists of one of four immigration related images and accompanying descriptive text.
The text for the images was kept as close to the original source as possible. However, when

21

See Appendix D
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necessary there was some manipulation of information (i.e. the relationship between the portrayed
immigrants), as to create a reasonable narrative.
Of the four treatment conditions, two were considered low-abuse frames and two were
considered high-abuse frames. The theory of deontic justice (Folger 1998, 2001) dictates that
perceived third-party abuse leads to deontic anger. Thus, the theoretical expectation is there will
be a positive relationship between the respondent’s perception that the behavior in a given frame
is abusive and the respondent’s reported level of deontic anger. More specifically, the higher the
reported abuse in the frame, the higher the reported deontic anger. Conversely, the lower the
reported abuse in the frame, the lower the reported feelings of deontic anger. The four frames from
the treatment conditions are found in the appendices22.
To determine which images should be in the Lucid survey, a pre-test was administered to
an undergraduate Political Science class at the University of Mississippi. The survey was
administered in Qualtrics, and all students who were enrolled in the class were able to access the
survey over a continuous period of one week via a link provided on Blackboard. Participation was
voluntary, and, as compensation for participation, students who submitted a survey received one
full extra credit point added to their final exam grade. All submissions were anonymous. To receive
credit, participants received a four-digit code at the end of the survey. The code, which served as
verification of completing the survey, was then uploaded to Blackboard as a Word document. A
total of 91 students completed the survey. Directions for the pre-test were worded as follows:
Each of the following ten scenarios consists of one image and text explaining the context of the
image. For each scenario you will answer four questions. There are no right or wrong answers.
You will receive the extra credit for this assignment regardless of your opinions.
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Per the instructions, the pre-test consisted of ten frames followed by four items measuring
the respondent’s emotional response to the frame on a five-point Likert scale (1=Not At All to
5=Extremely). Both the high- and low-abuse scenarios were chosen based on the two highest mean
scores and two lowest mean scores for the question measuring the respondent’s anger in response
to a given frame. The full pre-test with descriptive statistics for anger is found in the appendices23.
In the Lucid survey, the first item following the viewed frame is “Are the immigrants in
the above scenario being treated fairly?” This measure of fairness is a binary variable labeled
treatment_fair that is coded as 0=No if the respondent perceives the immigrant’s treatment in the
frame as unfair and 1=Yes if the respondent perceives that the immigrant’s treatment in the frame
as fair. As deontic anger is a response to the violation of the societal norm of fairness (Folger 1998,
2001), the expectation is that respondents who answer that their viewed frame is unfair (0=No)
will report higher deontic anger than respondents who answer that their viewed frame is fair
(1=Yes). This specific measure of fairness is not taken from extant studies on deontic anger.
However, because this study presents the first empirical test of deontic anger in political science
literature, fully establishing that perceptions of abusive behavior are unfair is necessary for
theoretical support.
The question following the assessment of fairness measures the main independent variable,
observed abusive behavior (observed_abuse). The purpose of this variable is to measure the extent
to which a respondent perceived a viewed frame to be abusive. The measure is adapted from
Mitchell and Ambrose’s (2007) study testing the relationship between abusive supervision and
workplace deviance. For this study, the wording of Mitchell and Ambrose’s (2007) items were
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altered so that they would pertain specifically to the immigration frames. Six items are measured
on a 7-point Likert scale (1= strongly disagree; 7=strongly agree) and are as follows: 1) “The
immigrants’ privacy was not respected,” 2) “The immigrants were ridiculed,” 3) “The immigrants
were abused,” 4) “The immigrants were humiliated,” 5) “The immigrants were not allowed to
interact with each other,” and 6) “The immigrants were made to feel stupid.”
There is an expected positive relationship between the viewed frame and the variable’s
mean, such that the observed abuse mean will be lower for the low-abuse frames than for the highabuse frames. Additionally, there is an expected positive relationship between perceived fairness
(treatment_fair) and observed abuse, such that the mean for observed abuse is higher among
respondents who answer that their viewed frame is not fair.
The main dependent variable, deontic anger (deontic_anger) is constructed from items that
were adopted from Preisemuth and Schminke (2019) and Richins (1997). The wording of the items
measuring deontic anger24 was altered to pertain specifically to the immigration frames.
Additionally, Priesemuth and Schminke (2019) measure deontic reaction to the third-party
observation of abusive supervision in the workplace. In their study, the abuser (i.e. the supervisor)
is easily identifiable, and so their items measuring deontic anger measure the respondent’s feelings
toward the supervisor. However, the nature of this study is that the abuser is not as easily identified.
When necessary, the frames do make note that the immigrants in the image were either detained
or arrested. However, in order to avoid a priming effect, the entity that is most responsible for the
detainment or arrest is not specifically stated in the frame’s narrative.
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Deontic anger is constructed from the following items: 1) “The immigrant’s treatment
makes me angry,” 2) “I feel resentful toward the immigrants’ treatment,” and 3) “The immigrants’
treatment makes me feel irritated.” Using a 7-point Likert scale (1= Strongly Disagree to
7=Strongly Agree), descriptive statistics for deontic anger indicate that of 511 observations, the
mean reported deontic anger across conditions is 3.962 (mean=3.962, SD=2.143)
In relation to the observed abuse, there is an expected strong positive relationship between
the perception that the behavior in the frame was abuse and the respondent’s deontic anger.
Essentially, as observed abuse increases, deontic anger should increase as well. Conversely, as
observed abuse decreases, deontic anger should decrease as well. Likewise, deontic anger should
be higher among those respondents who answer that their viewed frame was unfair (0=No) than
among those respondents who answer that their viewed frame was fair (1=Yes).
An expectation of this study is that the relationship between the observation of abusive
behavior and deontic anger is more significant than the relationship between the observation of
abusive behavior and other negative emotions. As such, this study controls for a broad range of
established negative emotions. Because there is not a single set of negative emotions that is
consistently utilized in political science, this dissertation utilizes the mean index of Richins (1997)
comprehensive adaptation of Plutchik and Kellerman’s (1974) Emotions Profile Index, which
measures negative emotions on a seven-point Likert scale (1=strongly disagree; 7=agree). As with
the variables observed abuse and deontic anger, the items measuring discontent, worry, sadness,
fear, and shame25 are adapted to fit the context of the immigration narratives presented in the
treatment condition frames.
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Each of the negative emotion variables is constructed from the mean index of Richins’ (1997) items measuring
each respective emotion. See Appendix C.
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The proposed moderator for the second hypothesis is the strength of the respondent’s
partisan identification. The variable party_strength is a standard demographic in political science
literature (e.g. Feldman, Huddy, Wronski, and Lown 2019). This item is coded from 1 to 7
(1=Strong Republican to 7=Strong Democrat). There is an expected significant moderating effect
such that identifying as a Republican weakens the relationship between observed abusive behavior
and deontic anger while identifying as a Democrat strengthens the relationship between observed
abusive behavior and deontic anger.
Results
Based on pre-test data, the high-abuse conditions were frame 1 (Detention Facility, n=144)
and frame 2 (Medical Treatment, n=115), and the low-abuse conditions were frame 3 (Ceremony,
n=121) and frame 4 (ICE Raid, n=142). Regression results are consistent with pre-test data. There
is a negative relationship between the treatment condition and the perception of abuse reported by
the respondent (b=-.509, p=.000). As predicted, in the Lucid survey, respondents considered the
treatment of the immigrants in frames 1 and 2 to be more abusive than the treatment of the
immigrants in frames 3 and 4 (Table 2.1 and Figure 2.1).
Table 2.1: Perceived Abuse x Condition
Coefficient

Std. Err.

Condition
Medical Treatment
Ceremony
ICE Raid

-0.478*
-2.256***
-1.166***

0.214
0.211
0.203

Constant

4.695

0.143

Notes:
OLS Regression
n = 514, Adjusted R2 =.09
+=Detention Facility as base
condition
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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Figure 2.1: Perceived Abuse x Condition

Results do indicate, however, that the respondent’s perception of fairness (treatment_fair)
does have a statistically significant effect on the respondent’s deontic anger. A t-test indicates a
significant difference (d=2.635, p=.000) in deontic anger between respondents who reported that
the behavior in their viewed frame was fair (1=Yes, n=261, mean=2.680, SD=1.865) and
respondents who reported that the behavior in their viewed frame was not fair (0=No, n=250,
mean=5.300, SD= 1.502). Further analysis indicates that, there is a strong, negative relationship
between perception of fairness and the respondent’s level of deontic anger (b=-2.619, p=.000)
(Table 2.2). Essentially, respondents who reported that the treatment in their viewed frame was
fair report lower levels of deontic anger than respondents who report that the treatment in their
viewed frame was not fair.
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Table 2.2: Fairness and Deontic Anger
Coefficient
-2.619***
5.3

Fair Treatment
Constant

Std. Err.
0.150
0.107

Notes:
OLS Regression
n = 511, Adjusted R2 = .372
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001

Likewise, as expected, there is a significant relationship between perceived fairness and
the extent to which the respondent perceived their viewed frame as abusive. A t-test indicates a
significant difference (d=2.228, p=0.000) in observed abuse between respondents who reported
that the behavior in their viewed frame was fair (n=264, mean=2.666, SD=1.654) and those who
said that the behavior was not fair (n=250, mean=4.894, SD=1.394) (Table 2.3). Further, the
regression coefficient for fairness (b=-2.228) indicates that there is a negative relationship between
perceiving the observed treatment as fair and reporting that the observed treatment is abusive
(p=.000) (Table 2.3). Respondents who perceive their viewed frame as unfair report a higher level
of observed abuse than respondents who perceive their viewed frame as fair.
Table 2.3: Fairness and Abuse

Fair Treatment
Constant

Coefficient
-2.228***
4.894

Std. Err.
0.135
0.096

Notes:
OLS Regression
n = 514, Adjusted R2 = .345
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001

A regression of the main dependent variable (deontic_anger) and main independent
variable (observed_abuse) offer significant support for H1. As expected, at a significance level of
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p<.05, there is a strong, positive relationship between a respondent reporting that a given treatment
condition was abusive and that respondent’s reported deontic anger (b=.950, p=.000). Results
suggest that the greater the reported observed abuse, the greater the reported deontic anger. Adding
gender (b=.203, p=.057), race (b=.078, p=.151), income (b=.008, p=7.99), education (b=-.000,
p=.999), region (b=-.0111, p=.822), and age (b=.000, p=.823) to the model, only observed_abuse
remains statistically significant (b=.948, p=0.000) (Table 2.4).

Table 2.4: Perception of Abuse and Deontic Anger

Observed Abuse

Coefficient
0.948***

Std. Err.
0.281

Control Variables
Gender
Age
Education
Income
Race
Region

0.203
-0.001
0.000
0.008
0.078
-0.011

0.107
0.003
0.032
0.032
0.054
0.051

Constant

0.214

0.279

Notes:
OLS Regression
n = 511, Adjusted R2 = .703
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001

A regression interacting observed abuse with condition adds additional support for H1.
Across all conditions, there is a positive relationship between the perception of abuse and deontic
anger (b=1.038, p=0.000). Essentially, regardless of whether a condition is denoted as high abuse
or low abuse, as the reported perception of abuse increases, so does reported deontic anger (Table
2.5 and Figure 2.2).
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Table 2.5: Interaction (Abuse x Condition)
Observed Abuse

Coefficient
1.038***

Std. Err.
0.057

+Condition
Medical Treatment
Ceremony
ICE Raid

1.287**
0.447
0.402

0.398
0.343
0.364

++Interactions
Abuse_x_Condition
Medical Treatment
Ceremony
ICE Raid

-0.241
-0.134
-0.063

0.083
0.086
0.081

Constant

-0.076

0.283

Notes:
OLS Regression
n = 511, Adjusted R2 = .712
+

= Detention Facility Condition is the base category

++

= Detention Facility x Observed Abuse is the base category
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
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Figure 2.2: Interaction (Abuse x Condition)
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As stated in H2 a respondent’s partisanship is expected to moderate the relationship
between observed_abuse and deontic_anger. Between all Republican respondents (n=197,
mean=3.157, SD=2.058) and all Democrat respondents (n=283, mean=4.518, SD=2.032), a twosample t-test reveals a statistically significant difference in mean deontic_anger (d=-1.360,
p=.000). As a whole, Democrats have higher mean deontic_anger than Republicans. Within the
party, a two-sample t-test of only respondents who identify as either Strong Republican (n=115,
mean=3.005, SD=2.095) or Strong Democrat (n=151, mean=4.768, SD=2.011) produces like
results (d=-1.762, p=.000). Comparing the mean deontic_anger of only the strongest party
identifiers, Strong Democrats score significantly higher in deontic_anger than Strong Republicans.
Likewise, there is a statistically significant difference in means (d=-1.204, p=.000) between
Republican leaners (n=36, mean=3.287, SD=1.993) and Democrat leaners (n=40, mean=4.491,
SD=2.173).
A regression analysis indicates that there is strong positive relationship between the
respondent’s reported level of deontic anger and that respondent’s reported partisanship
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(party_strength) (n=479, b=.284, p=.000) (Table 2.6a). As expected based on t-test results,
deontic_anger increases as the respondent moves from Strong Republican (1) to Strong Democrat
(7). A second regression that interacts observed_abuse with party_strength finds strong support
for H2 (p=.000). Controlling for gender (b=.178, p=.103), age (b=.000 p=.867), income (b=-.010,
p=.743), education (b=-.010, p=.792), region (b=.016, p=.750), and race (b=.056, p=.332),
party_strength mitigates observed_abuse such that holding observed_abuse constant,
deontic_anger is lower moving from Strong Democrat (7) to Strong Republican (1) (Table 2.6b
and Figure 2.3).

Table 2.6a: Partisanship and Deontic Anger

Partisanship
Constant

Coefficient Std. Err.
0.284***
0.038
2.739
0.187

Notes:
OLS Regression
n = 479, Adjusted R2 = .102
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
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Table 2.6b: Interaction (Partisanship x Observed Abuse)

Observed Abuse

Coefficient
0.988***

Std. Err.
0.058

-0.111
0.882
0.002
0.857
0.559
1.129***

0.439
0.474
0.458
0.461
0.473
0.312

+Partisanship
2
3
4
5
6
7
++Interactions
Partisanship x Observed Abuse
2
3
4
5
6
7

0.008
-0.215
0.080
-0.088
-0.102
-0.146

0.112
0.132
0.116
0.109
0.115
0.075

Control_Variables
Age
Gender
Education
Region
Income
Race

0.000
0.178
-0.010
0.016
-0.010
0.056

0.003
0.108
0.038
0.052
0.033
0.058

Constant

-0.109

0.334

Notes:
OLS Regression
n = 479, Adjusted R2 = .715
+=Strong Republican is the base category
++=Strong Republican x Observed Abuse is the base
category
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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Figure 2.3: Marginal Effects (Partisanship x Observed Abuse)
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Conclusion
In conclusion, the purpose of this dissertation chapter is 1) to position deontic anger within
extant literature in political science and 2) to support the inclusion of deontic anger in political
science through statistical analysis. In line with theoretical expectations, there is support for both
of the presented hypotheses. Overall, there is a statistically significant positive relationship
between the perceived abuse and deontic anger, such that as the perception of abuse increases, so
does reported deontic anger. This finding remains significant across both high-abuse and lowabuse conditions and with consideration of control variables. With regard to political party
affiliation (H2), findings are significant among both Democrats and Republicans. However, as
suggested, reported deontic anger is collectively higher among Democrats than among
Republicans.
The third and fourth chapters of this dissertation will offer additional empirical analysis of
deontic anger in relation to both political attitudes and political behavior. In chapter three, political
attitudes will be measured as individual preferences toward redistribution and immigration.
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Essentially addressing the question of the extent to which feelings of greater deontic anger affect
the likelihood that an individual will be more or less supportive of accommodating redistributive
and immigration policies. The final empirical chapter, chapter four, will examine the relationship
between deontic anger and political behaviors, such as willingness to give charitable donations to
pro-immigration organizations or causes. The expectation of the respective empirical chapters is
to further establish the place of deontic anger in political science, as well as to further our
understanding of individual motivations for political attitudes and behaviors.
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III. THE EFFECT OF DEONTIC ANGER ON ATTITUDES TOWARD IMMIGRATION
AND REDISTRIBUTIVE POLICIES

Introduction
Rational choice theory has long been a standard for explaining political decision-making
(e.g. Downs 1957; Fiorina 1981; Kiewiet 1983; Wetherford 1983). Downs’ (1957) theoretical
premise holds that political decisions are a calculated product of self-interest, essentially devoid
of emotions. A growing body of literature, however, suggests that emotions play a critical - if not
defining - role in directing our political decision-making (e.g. Renshon 2011; Albertson and
Kushner Gadarian 2015; Valentino et al. 2011; Marcus 2002; Marcus and MacKuen 2002; Brader
et al. 2008; Huddy et al. 2005). This is not to say that emotions necessarily supersede rationality,
but, at the least, emotional processing is required in order for a rational decision to occur
(McDermott 2004). Further, the directional influence of emotion on a rational decision is
determined by which emotion is experienced in a given situation (e.g. Phan 2012).
The purpose of this empirical chapter is to build on literature that explores the role of
emotions in political decision-making. Although studies have established that emotions do
influence political decision-making, there is significantly less understanding of how context
motivates these emotions, especially with regard to anger (e.g. Phan 2012). Building on the
analyses from Chapter 2, this chapter seeks to explore the extent to which deontic anger is triggered
through episodic frames, and the subsequent political attitudes that result from that deontic anger.
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More specifically, this chapter examines the extent to which deontic anger affects individual
support for immigration and redistributive policies, since preferences for both are influenced by
negative emotions (e.g. Albertson and Kushner Gadarian 2015; Sznycer et al. 2017).
This chapter explores how anger affects attitudes toward immigration and immigration
policy and related attitudes toward redistribution. More specifically, the intention of this chapter
is to consider anger as a multidimensional discrete emotion, and to explore the effect of deontic
anger on individual attitudes toward immigration and redistributive policies. Deontic anger stems
from deonance theory (e.g. Bucciarelli and Johnson-Laird 2005), which dictates that all people
should be treated in a way that upholds the societal norm of fairness, meaning absent of abuse.
Generally speaking, the theory holds that people should not be treated in a way that is abusive, as
to do so would violate the principle of fairness. When a third-party observes that someone has been
treated in a way they believe to be abusive, the societal norm of fairness is violated, and the
observer of the injustice experiences a deontic reaction that is termed deontic anger (Folger 2001).
This means that even those who are opposed to immigration as a whole could theoretically be
opposed to an immigrant being treated in a manner that is not consistent with the societal norm of
fairness.
The purpose of this chapter is not to dispute the evidence of rationality in political decisionmaking, but rather to expound on evidence that supports the integral role of emotions. As such,
this chapter proceeds by first reviewing literature that is relevant to rational studies of attitudes
toward immigration and redistributive policies. This is followed by a theoretical explanation of
why deontic anger, as a negative emotion, is expected to influence individual attitudes toward
those policies. This chapter concludes with an empirical analysis that tests the relationship between
deontic anger and individual preferences toward both immigration policy and redistributive policy.
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Rational Policy Attitudes
Although the central premise of this dissertation is exploring the relationship between the
emotion deontic anger and individual preferences for immigration and redistributive policies,
literature on rational choice in political decision-making should not be ignored. In many contexts,
and for some subgroups, self-interest directs policy preferences (e.g. Chong et al. 2001; Citrin and
Green 1990). However, at times, individuals seem to exhibit preferences for policies that are
counter to their self-interest. Thus, extant literature on rational decision-making will be explored
before considering the role of emotions, specifically deontic anger.
Rational Attitudes Toward Redistribution and Immigration
Annually, the federal government of the United States spends billions of dollars across
hundreds of social welfare programs26, all of which serve to support low-income households.
Although the total amount spent varies between years and over time, there is a general pattern of
increase in both dollar amount and percentage of the federal budget that is dedicated to social
welfare programs. For example, percentage wise, the increase from 2008 to 2011 was 32 percent.
Jeff Session’s 2011 United States Senate Budget Committee Report 27 further expounds upon the
magnitude of social welfare spending in the United States:

As a historical comparison, spending on the 10 largest of the 83 programs (which account
for the bulk of federal welfare spending) has doubled as a share of the federal budget over
just the last 30 years. In inflation-adjusted dollars, the amount expended on these 10
programs has increased by 378 percent over that time.

26

http://federalsafetynet.com/safety-net-programs.html

27

https://www.budget.senate.gov/chairman/newsroom/press/sessions-comments-on-congressional-reportshowing-welfare-is-single-largest-federal-expense
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Considering the amount of federal tax dollars that are designated to social welfare spending
each year, a conclusion that the majority of American people support the spending would be
logical. However, evidence suggests that there is significant variation in who most strongly
supports welfare and when they support it. Interestingly, not even those who stand to benefit the
most from receiving social welfare are always among those who support the programs the most.
According to Hoschild (1981, p.1-2):
Since most of the population have a less than average amount of wealth – the median level
of holdings is below the mean- more people would benefit than would lose from downward
redistribution. And yet never has the poorer majority of the population, not to speak of the
poorest minority, voted itself out of its economic disadvantage.
Economic Factors and Attitudes Toward Redistribution
Economic self-interest is one driving factor of individual attitudes toward redistributive
policy (Forma 1997). In some instances, such as rising unemployment, immediate need does, in
fact, have a significant effect on individual support for redistribution (Neundorf and Soroka 2017;
Owens and Pedulla 2014). Essentially, because job loss could lead to personal need for income
redistribution, individuals who are in a current state of unemployment express stronger support for
more liberal redistributive policies28 than those who are employed. On the other hand, even if an
individual could receive an immediate benefit from redistribution, those who perceive that their
future income prospects could be negatively affected by redistribution express weaker levels of
support for liberal redistributive policy (Alesina and La Ferrara 2005). According to the “prospect
of upward mobility” (POUM) hypothesis, depending on individual potential for upward mobility,

28

A liberal redistributive policy is one that supports the transfer of “income and wealth from one group to another
such that everyone enjoys at least a minimal standard of living” (Lumen Learning 2020).

45

the poor may, in fact, vote against income redistribution if their perceived future incomes will be
negatively affected by liberal redistributive policies (Wong 2004: Benabou and Ok 2001).
Economic Factors and Attitudes Toward Immigration
As will be explained, just as economic self-interest is likely to motivate individual attitudes
toward redistributive policy, it also motivates individual attitudes toward immigration. There is
some evidence that American immigration attitudes are a result of ambivalence. This means that
attitudes could simply be the product of associating immigrants with either positive or negative
traits (Reyna, Dobria, and Wetherell 2013). However, the prevailing finding is that the direction
of American attitudes toward immigrants and immigration are negative as a result of perceived
economic impact. As Reyna et al. (2013, p. 342) write, “In America, research reveals that, although
attitudes toward immigration have ebbed and flowed with social, economic and cultural changes,
attitudes toward immigrants have largely remained negative.”
Esses, Brochu, and Dickson (2012, p. 113) note, “Perceptions of economic costs and
benefits play an important role in determining attitudes toward immigrants and immigration.”
These economic concerns are presented under realistic group conflict theory (RGCT) (Levine and
Campbell 1972; Sheriff 1966), which suggests that negative attitudes result from perceptions that
an “in-group” “out-group” conflict is present. In terms of studies on immigrants and immigration,
immigrants (an “out-group”) are perceived by some groups of Americans (an “in-group”) as
competition for economic resources (Esses, Brochu, and Dickson 2012).
State-level case studies offer supporting evidence for the relationship between economic
concerns and negative immigration attitudes. One such example is evidenced by bills addressing
illegal immigration that were passed in Arizona and Georgia. In both instances, the enacted
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legislation was framed as a way to reduce illegal immigration’s financial impact on the respective
states (Esses, Brochu, and Dickson 2012). Further, negative attitudes are perpetuated by feelings
of resource stress such as the presence and salience of immigrant groups who are believed to be a
significant source of economic competition (i.e. a belief in zero-sum benefits) (Esses, Jackson, and
AbuAyyash 2010). As a specific example, “As unemployment increased and Gross Domestic
Product real growth rate decreased in Arizona over the course of 2006-2009, attitudes toward
undocumented Mexican immigrants became progressively more negative” (Esses, Brochu, and
Dickson 2012, p. 134).
Additional support for the economic explanation of negative immigration attitudes is
offered by models of political economy. Based on the theory of factor proportions (Scheve and
Slaughter 2001; Mayda 2006), as the number of low-skilled immigrants rises, the ratio of lowskilled immigrants to both low- and highly-skilled natives in a given country also rises
(Hainmueller 2010; Borjas 1999; Borjas, Freeman, and Katz 1996, 1997). For low-skilled natives,
an increase in low-skilled immigrants, who often willingly accept low pay, means an increase in
labor market competition, which can lead to native unemployment or a decrease in native wages
(Scheve and Slaughter 2001; Mayda 2006). As supported by Borjas’s (2003, p. 1) study on
immigration and native wages, “a 10 percent increase in supply reduces wages by 3 to 4 percent.”
Specific to the United States, when given the choice in a survey experiment, both high- and lowskilled Americans show a preference for highly-skilled immigrants (Hainmueller and Hiscox
2010). In addition, results of a conjoint analysis conducted by Hainmueller and Hopkins (2014)
also indicates a positive relationship between an immigrant’s education level and native
preferences for that immigrant, such that an immigrant with a college education is preferred to an
immigrant without a college education. A main implication of the collective findings is that
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Americans prefer highly-skilled and highly-educated immigrants because (1) they are likely to be
able to produce enough wealth to avoid the need for American social welfare benefits, and (2) they
are less likely to pursue jobs that low-skilled and less educated Americans might need.
Social Identity and Policy Attitudes
Social identity theory can be used to further explore the in-group/out-group conflict (e.g.
Esses, Brochu, and Dickson 2012; Levine and Campbell 1972; Sheriff 1966) that offers some
explanation for American attitudes toward both immigration and redistribution. Social identity is
“that part of an individual’s self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership in
a social group” (Tajfel 1978), and it consists of either shared psychological or physical traits, and
those who share an individual’s psychological or physical traits are considered to be part of that
person’s “in-group” (Tajfel 1978). When people are unable to match their own social identity
within a group pursuing income equality, they are less likely to support redistribution for that group
(Battu and Zenou 2010). This is because failure to share an identity, or “group,” means a perceived
failure to develop the common attitudes and values required to develop a defining “sense of
belonging” (Costa-Font and Cowell 2015). Essentially, people inherently prefer to help those with
whom they most strongly identify.
Evidence of social identity directing individual policy preferences is supported in literature
on redistribution. Essentially, “people appear to be more likely to redistribute to the groups they
identify with, be that identification based on ethnicity, religious group, social class, nation state or
region” (Costa-Font and Cowell 2015, p. 357; see also Battu and Zenou 2010). Alesina and Glaeser
(2004) find that as racial fractionalization increases, social spending decreases. This builds on
Luttmer’s (2001) “negative exposure effect,” which suggests that when the share of welfare
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recipients for one’s own race increases, support for welfare spending among members of that race
also increases. On the other hand, as the rate of welfare recipients of a different race goes up,
support for local (community) welfare goes down. In short, racial/ethnic identification, especially
when that identification is strong, leads to in-group bias (e.g. Castano et al. 2002).
In terms of redistributive preferences, we are significantly more likely to be willing to
extend redistributive benefits to those who share our race/ethnicity, than those who do not.
Essentially, racial heterogeneity is not conducive to a strong welfare state, as people are less likely
to support the redistribution of income if it benefits a race or ethnicity with whom they do not
identify (Gilens 1996; 1999). As such, feelings of group threat in terms of race/ethnicity logically
extend to attitudes toward immigrants and immigration, since a substantial increase in immigration
generally creates shifts in the racial and ethnic heterogeneity of a society. Further, because changes
in the immigrant population are, in fact, responsible for demographic shifts away from
homogeneity, there is significant support for the argument that “how Americans think about
immigration and immigrants is a major factor in how they think about welfare” (Garand, Xu, and
Davis 2017, p.1).
The Effect of Immigration Attitudes on Attitudes Toward Redistribution
Historically, racial stereotypes have resulted in low support for liberal redistributive
policies. Black Americans have often been perceived by white Americans to be lazy, and, thus,
disproportionately reliant on welfare (Gilens 2000). As such, Americans’ perceptions of welfare
have largely been influenced by how Americans think about Blacks in America. Thus, Americans
who perceive that the Black population receives a disproportionate percentage of welfare are more
likely to have a general dislike for social welfare (e.g. Xu 2017, Gilens 1996; Luttmer 2001;
Quadagno 1994). However, evidence suggests that Americans’ negative sentiments toward
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welfare have shifted from Blacks to immigrants and immigration (e.g. Burgoon, Koster, and van
Egmond 2010; Eger 2010; Hjerm and Schnabel 2012; Larsen 2011; Mau and Burkhardt 2009;
Sumino 2013). In fact, the sentiment has not only shifted, but “the magnitude of the effect of
immigration surpasses the magnitude of the attitudes toward Blacks” (Garand, Xu, and Davis
2017, p.1). Garand et al. (2017, p.7) expresses the shift in the attitudinal relationship in the
following way:
It’s not difficult to draw parallels between Gilens’ arguments and the linkage between
attitudes toward immigrants and public support for welfare. For example, immigrants are
overrepresented among the ranks of welfare recipients, it is not implausible to argue that
Americans might have shifted their attention from African Americans to immigrants when
they assess their welfare attitudes, precisely because of a similar fear that immigrants might
absorb welfare sources.
In conclusion, there is significant support for the role of economic self-interest in directing
attitudes toward both immigration and redistribution. Further, there is reasonable theoretical and
empirical evidence to suggest a positive relationship between attitudes toward immigration and
attitudes toward redistribution, such that an increase/decrease in favorability toward immigration
is correlated to an increase/decrease in favorability toward redistribution. The collective
implication of findings in extant literature suggests that when economic self-interest affects
attitudes toward immigration, attitudes toward redistribution will subsequently change as well.
Thus, while the empirical analysis for this chapter does measure individual preferences for both
immigration and redistribution, the assumption and expectation is that these preferences will be
highly correlated.
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The Effect of Negative Emotions on Political Attitudes
Given the evidence supporting the role of self-interest in directing specific attitudes,
especially in terms of individual preferences toward immigration and redistribution (e.g. Sznycer
et al. 2017; Forma 1997; Neundorf and Soroka 2017; Owens and Peduella 2014; Alesina and Le
Ferrara 2005; Wong 2004; Benabou and Ok 2001; Reyna et al. 2013; Esses, Brochu, and Dickson
2012), the purpose of this chapter is not to dispute evidence of rationality in political attitudes and
decision-making. However, to attribute political attitudes only to rationality is to incorrectly
assume that people develop those attitudes, and make resulting political decisions, in the absence
of emotions. As Conover and Feldman (1986, p.51) write regarding the utilization of rational
choice, “despite its widespread acceptance and its long tradition in political analysis, there is a
serious problem with this perspective; it lacks a critical component – emotions.”

Further

addressing the significant effect of emotions, McDermott (2004, p.691) notes, “Emotion exerts an
impact on political decisions in decisive and significant ways……. Emotion can provide an
alternate basis for explaining and predicting political choice and action.”
The way in which emotions influence political attitudes is a result of which emotion is
experienced. Even though emotions can be either positive or negative, evidence suggests that
negative emotions have the potential to motivate attitudes in ways that positive emotions do not
(e.g. Leiserowitz 2006; Myers, Nisbet, Maibach, and Leiserowitz 2012; Gross 2009; Gross and
Thompson 2009). The rally ‘round the flag effect 29 ( Mueller 1970), for instance, is often cited to
support the effect of negative emotion on political attitudes. As an example, George W. Bush’s
approval rating saw a substantial increase following 9/11. Following the attacks, his approval

29

The rally ‘round the flag effect “represents sudden and dramatically powerful situation-specific shifts in attitudes
toward the American president” (Lambert et al. 2010, p. 886).
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rating hit 90%, which was a 39-point increase from his approval rating just prior to the events.
Essentially, “millions of Americans who did not support Bush – or even harbored strong
resentment toward him – on the day before 9/11 may have experienced an upward surge in attitudes
the very next day” (Lambert et al. 2010, p.886).
As evidenced, a negative emotion, such as feelings of anxiety or threat caused by a terrorist
attack, “can trigger powerful shifts in attitudes” (Lambert et al. 2010, p.887). However, different
negative emotions affect political attitudes in different ways. For example, while worry over
economic shocks may lead to support for government policies that offer protection against
economic risks (Hacker, Rehm, and Schlesinger 2013), feelings of threat over issues such as
terrorism may lead to support for policies that target threatening groups with punitive actions
(Huddy, Feldman, Taber, and Lahav 2005).
The specific negative emotions that are triggered in a given situation determine the
direction of individual policy preferences. Thus, to fully understand how negative emotions affect
the process of political decision-making (i.e. political attitudes and resulting policy preferences),
emotions should be considered distinct entities (Miller 2011). As such, this study utilizes the
discrete approach to studies of emotions which assumes that each emotion is distinct (Miller 2011).
The advantage of the discrete approach, as opposed to dimensional models which assume that
unique emotions “fit” under broad umbrellas, is the ability to analyze the situational effects of a
specific emotion.
Negative Emotions and Immigration
In terms of immigration, findings suggest that negative emotions such as anxiety
significantly affect attitudes toward immigrants and immigration policy (e.g. Albertson and
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Kushner Gadarian 2015). Generally speaking, these emotions may be triggered by economic
factors (e.g. Reyna et al. 2013; Esses, Brochu, and Dickson 2012; Levine and Campbell 1972) as
previously noted; however, symbolic threat also significantly affects attitudes toward immigrants
and immigration policy (e.g. Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014; Card et al. 2011). Symbolic threat
(i.e. cultural threat), is defined as “perceived group differences in morals, values, standards,
beliefs, and attitudes” (Stephan et al. 2002, p. 1243). In the context of American attitudes, a
symbolic threat is when there is a perception that the presence of an immigrant could potentially
threaten “the American way of life” (Hitlan et al. 2007). In essence, a symbolic threat is a concern
that the presence of immigrants who possess the most extreme differences from traditional
American attributes will “dilute” American ideals, such as equality, self-sufficiency, and
willingness to work hard (Garcia and Davidson 2013).
Regardless of whether negative attitudes toward immigrants and immigration are measured
in the context of economic or symbolic threats, a significant number of Americans have
consistently expressed negative emotions toward immigrants. For example, in reference to Gallup
polls conducted between 2001 and 2012 assessing American levels of worry over immigration,
Albertson and Kushner Gadarian (2015, p. 28) note, “Their polling shows an extremely worried
citizenry. Every time Americans are asked whether they are worried about illegal immigration,
more than half of the public responds that they worry either a great deal or a fair amount (in contrast
to only a little or not at all).” Essentially, the in-group/out-group conflict associated with threats
of immigration can trigger a mix of negative emotions such as fear, anger, and worry (e.g. Brader
et al. 2008).
Anxiety over immigration is the culmination of mixed negative emotions, which leads to
behaviors such as supporting immigration policies that are restrictive/protective as opposed to
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accommodating (e.g. Albertson and Kushner Gadarian 2015; Brader et al. 2008)30, as well as
willingness to seek out information (e.g. Albertson and Kushner Gadarian 2015; Brader et al.
2008). For example, Brader et al. (2008) conduct an experiment in which participants are exposed
to various news about immigrants entering the United States. In their first study, the authors
manipulate the nationality of the immigrants in episodic frames to examine which immigrant
nationality evokes the strongest levels of reported anxiety. They then measure subsequent political
attitudes and behavior by asking “whether immigration to the United States should be increased,
decreased, or kept the same” (Brader et al. 2008, p. 965). To measure information-seeking
behavior, respondents were then asked “if they would like more information about immigration
from a variety of sources, including pro-immigrant groups, and anti-immigrant groups” (Brader et
al. 2008, p. 966). Findings for responses to both questions suggest that greater feelings of anxiety
lead to preferences for a decreased number of immigrants in the United States (i.e. more
restrictive/protective immigration policies) and to a greater propensity to seek out information
from anti-immigration groups than respondents who report lesser feelings of anxiety.
The Effect of Deontic Anger
The presented evidence supports the effect of anxiety on political behavior. However, the
construction of anxiety as a variable tends to be flawed, specifically in relation to anger. Extant
studies that examine the effect of emotions on immigration attitudes tend to treat the emotion anger
in a generic manner, generally tossing it into the mix of negative emotions that construct anxiety.
However, evidence suggests that anger is categorical, and the type of anger that an individual

30

Immigration policies are classified as either accommodating (allowing for easier integration by offering services
such as in-state tuition and welfare benefits regardless of qualified status and prohibiting immigration status
checks) or restrictive (which blocks access to public services and enables law enforcement agencies to enforce all
applicable immigration laws) (Wills and Commins 2017)
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experiences results in specific behavioral outcomes (Batson et al. 2007). Essentially, we are
motivated differently by three established types of anger: personal, empathic, and deontic (Batson
et al. 2007), and our behavioral response depends on which type of anger we experience. While
personal and empathic anger are, in some way, a threat to “self” (e.g. Batson et al. 2007), deontic
anger is a response to a violation of the societal norm of fairness (e.g. Batson et al. 2007). As such,
while the behavioral response of someone experiencing personal or empathic anger is likely to be
retaliatory or punishing in nature (e.g. Batson et al. 2007), someone experiencing deontic anger is
likely to engage in restorative behavior which reestablishes the moral standard of fairness that has
been violated (O’Mara et al. 2011).
In immigration studies that do give anger individual consideration, the general assumption
is that the behavioral response will be negative (e.g. Brader et al. 2008; Albertson and Kushner
Gadarian 2015). However, considering the reviewed deontic anger literature in Chapter 2, the
expectation that anger does not lead to helping behavior is flawed. Individuals who react to either
symbolic (i.e. cultural) (e.g. Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014; Card et al. 2012) or realistic (i.e.
economic) (e.g. Brader et al. 2008) immigration threats by supporting policies that restrict
immigration, are most likely experiencing personal anger. Restricting immigration has the
potential to increase personal opportunity while mitigating the effects of cultural or economic
threat. Thus, the feelings of anger that prompt such behavior are likely a response to an individual
feeling that the “self” has been threatened in some way (i.e. personal anger).
Conversely, if an individual believes that the immigrants in a given context are being
mistreated somehow, that person is likely to experience deontic anger, which seeks restorative
justice rather than punishing or retaliatory behavior. Deontic theory states that when observing a
moral violation of unfair treatment that is abusive in some way, the observer will experience
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deontic anger and exhibit a specific behavioral response. Some literature suggests that deontic
responses could be to withdraw from an event or to simply do nothing (Greenbaum et al. 2013).
However, given the behavioral motivation of deontic anger (i.e. to restore justice), to withdraw
from a situation or to do nothing is unlikely. Extant literature also suggests that the observer may
choose to punish an abuser (i.e. transgressor) (O’Reilly and Aquino 2011; Skarlicki and Rupp
2010; Turillo, Folger, Lavelle, Umphress and Gee 2002). However, based on the theoretical
premise of deontic anger, to punish would be consistent with personal or empathic anger rather
than deontic anger. Finally, the observer may choose to compensate the victim (Priesemuth and
Schminke 2019).
I posit that to compensate is the restorative response that is most consistent with the
theoretical premise of deontic anger. In terms of immigration, a third-party who observes that an
immigrant has been treated unjustly may seek restorative measures in the way of supporting liberal
immigration policies and redistributive policies, either of which could reasonably be considered
restorative for a victimized individual.

H1a: Deontic anger has a positive effect on support for liberal/accommodating immigration
policies.

Support for
liberal/accommodating
immigration policies

Deontic Anger
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H1b: Deontic anger has a positive effect on support for liberal/accommodating redistributive
policies.

Support for
liberal/accommodating
redistributive policies

Deontic Anger

Differentiating Deontic Anger from Empathy
Like deontic anger, empathy may also lead someone who has observed injustice to want to
help a victim in some way (de Waal 2008). Because the behavioral outcome associated with feeling
either deontic anger or empathy could be similar, the two emotions could potentially be confused,
leading to a misunderstanding of which emotions are triggered in specific scenarios. As such, what
follows is a brief discussion of how empathy is to be differentiated from deontic anger.
Empathy is defined as an emotion that “allows one to quickly and automatically relate to
the emotional state of others” (de Waal 2008, p. 282), and this ability to relate to the potential
feelings of distress of a victim may also lead to support for policies that would benefit the harmed
individual. Feldman et al. (2019, p. 5) write, “the addition of empathy lays bare two competing
bases for support for government social welfare policies: political principles and compassionate
support for welfare recipients.”31 However, extant findings also suggest that empathy alone is not
sufficient for action. Essentially, in and of itself, empathy is simply identification with an
emotional state, but it does not promote action tendencies. Instead, empathy works in conjunction

31

See Batson et al. 1995
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with other emotions to motivate the desire to help (Eisenberg 2000; Goetz, Keltner, and SimonThomas 2010).
Stemming from empathy, compassion is the emotion that is most likely to drive the desire
to help a victimized individual (Eisenberg 2000; Goetz, Keltner, and Simon-Thomas 2010).
However, much like anxiety, compassion is a mix of emotions that may include empathy as well
as emotions such as caring and sympathy. In other words, the helping behavior that some might
argue is a product of empathy is actually the result of the umbrella emotion, compassion. Thus,
while there is a reasonable expectation that there is a correlation between deontic anger and
empathy, there are no theoretical reasons to believe that support for specific policies is a direct
result of feeling empathy.
Further, to say that compassion leads to supporting specific policies creates the same
confusion as the claim that anxiety leads to supporting specific policies. Both emotions
(compassion and anxiety) are a mix of individual emotions. Measuring the effect of an emotional
construct assumes that the discrete emotions within that construct will always be triggered in the
same way, thus resulting in the same behavioral outcome. Yet, as evidenced by literature on anger
(Batson et al. 2008), single emotions can be multidimensional, and so they must be examined in
isolation.
The Effect of Partisanship
Theoretically, partisanship could mitigate the relationship between deontic anger and
support for specific immigration policies. Likening the strength of partisan identity to that of
religion, Green et al. (2002, p.4) write that “partisan identities are enduring features of citizens’
self-conceptions.” Essentially, once partisanship is adopted by an individual, that person will
“absorb the doctrinal positions that the group advocates” (Green et al. 2002, p.4). In fact, at least
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according to the seminal works of Campbell et al. (1960) and Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee
(1954), partisan attachment is so strong that “partisans ignore or deflect information that is
inconsistent with their party attachments” (Green et al. 2002, p.7). Furthermore, evidence suggests
that there is a positive relationship between the strength of partisanship and this perceptual
screening.
In terms of partisanship and immigration, Republicans are significantly more likely to
express worry over illegal immigration (Saad 2012) than their Democratic counterparts. This is
likely because, especially in recent years, elites within the Republican party have emphasized the
negative effects of illegal immigration, focusing on illegal immigrants crossing the border and
“taking” American jobs and resources (Schrock et al. 2017). In fact, during Donald Trump’s 2016
presidential campaign, a central premise was that there was an immigration crisis at the southern
United States border, and he infamously promised that “We will build a great wall along the
southern border”32 to prevent illegal immigrants from crossing into the United States.
Given the potential effect of partisanship on support for specific policies and the present
stance of the Republican Party on immigration, the expectation is that Republicans will be less
likely than Democrats to support liberal immigration policy. Further, given the relationship
between attitudes toward immigration and redistribution (Garand and Xu 2015), the effect is
expected to extend to attitudes toward redistributive policies.

32

https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-donald-trump-immigration-speech-transcript-20160831-snaphtmlstory.html
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H2a: There is a negative relationship between the individual’s strength of attachment to the
Republican party and the likelihood that the individual will support liberal/accommodating
immigration policies.
H2b: Deontic anger mitigates the effect of partisanship on individual support for
liberal/accommodating immigration policies.
H2c: There is a negative relationship between the individual’s strength of attachment to the
Republican party and the likelihood that the individual will support liberal/accommodating
redistributive policies.
H2d: Deontic anger mitigates the effect of partisanship on individual support for
liberal/accommodating redistributive policies.
Methodology
The analysis for this chapter builds on the findings of Chapter 2. Since the relationship
between observed abuse and deontic anger was established in the second chapter, this dissertation
now moves to examine the relationship between deontic anger and political attitudes on
immigration and redistributive policies. The survey experiment used to examine the relationship
between deontic anger and political attitudes was administered through the third-party platform,
Lucid in March of 2020, and it was explained in detail in Chapter 2.
For this chapter, deontic anger and partisanship, both of which were explained in Chapter
2, are the main independent variables of interest. The dependent variables of interest are
immigration_attitudes and

redistributive_attitudes. Immigration_attitudes

(mean= .767,

SD=.322) is adapted from Utych (2018), and the measure is a construct of three items administered
on the Lucid survey. The following items have binary responses: 1) “Would you favor or oppose
legislation to increase border security in order to make it more difficult for individuals to enter the
country illegally?” and 2) “Would you favor or oppose legislation that would allow undocumented
immigrants in the country to apply for legal status?” The item “Do you think the number of
immigrants from foreign countries who are permitted to come to the United States to live should
be INCREASED, LEFT THE SAME as it is now, or DECREASED?” is coded from 0 to 2.
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Redistributive_attitudes (mean= 3.47, SD=1.03) is also a construct of three items
administered on the Lucid survey. The item “The government should take measures to reduce
differences in income levels” is measured on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from Strongly Disagree
(1) to Strongly Agree (7) (Senik et al. 2008). The item “We are spending too much money, too
little money or about the right amount on social security” (Alesina and La Ferrara 2005) is coded
from 0 to 2. The item “How important would you say it is for a person to support people who are
worse off than themselves?” is measured using a 5-point Likert scale ranging from Not Important
(1) to Extremely Important (5).
Results
A regression analysis was used to examine the relationship between deontic anger and
support for liberal/accommodating immigration policies and to determine whether standard
demographics affect the proposed relationship. Findings offer support for H1a. There is a
statistically significant positive relationship between deontic anger and support for
liberal/accommodating immigration policies (n=511, b=.0367, p=.000) such that as deontic anger
increases, so does the likelihood of support for liberal/accommodating immigration policies. Of
the standard control variables, only age (b=-.002, p=.001) and education (b=.019, p=.042) were
statistically significant. The implication is that holding deontic anger constant, younger
respondents with higher levels of education are more likely to support liberal/accommodating
immigration policies than older respondents and those with lower levels of education. The
variables race (b=.009, p=.067), income (b=.012, p=.133), gender (b=-.050, p=.067), and region
(b=-.008, p=.504) were not statistically significant (Table 3.1).
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Table 3.1: Immigration Policy Support
Deontic Anger

Coefficient
0.036***

Std. Err.
0.006

Control_Variables
Gender
Age
Education
Income
Race
Region

-0.050
-0.002**
0.019*
0.012
0.009
-0.008

0.027
0.001
0.042
0.133
0.477
0.504

Constant

0.659

0.000

Notes:
OLS Regression
n = 511, Adjusted R2 = .114
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001

A

second

regression

analysis

testing

the

relationship

between

support

for

liberal/accommodating immigration policies and deontic anger by condition offers additional
support for H1a. Table 3.2 displays output of the interaction between deontic anger and condition.
However, because interaction results can be complex to interpret, a marginal effects model is used
to show the relationship between immigration attitudes and the interaction between deontic anger
and condition (Figure 3.1). Although the Medical Treatment, Ice Raid, and Detention Facility
conditions did not affect the relationship between deontic anger and support for
liberal/accommodating immigration policies, respondents who were shown the Ceremony
condition did not appear to have their policy preferences for immigration driven by deontic anger.
Thus, the context of this specific low-abuse condition seems to mitigate the effect of deontic anger;
however, based on the results of the other three conditions, it seems that deontic anger, rather than
a given frame, motivates support for liberal/accommodating immigration policies.
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Table 3.2: Immigration Policy Support (Condition x Deontic Anger)
Deontic Anger

Coefficient
0.048***

Std. Err.
0.012

+Condition
Medical Treatment
Ceremony
ICE Raid

0.034
0.197*
0.031

0.098
0.080
0.083

++Interactions
Condition x Deontic Anger
Medical Treatment
Ceremony
ICE Raid

0.006
-0.031
0.014

0.019
0.196
0.017

Constant

0.499

0.064

Notes:
OLS Regression
n = 511
Adjusted R2=.092
+=Detention Facility Condition is the base category
++=Detention Facility x Deontic Anger is the base category
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001

63

Figure 3.1: Immigration Policy Support (Condition x Deontic
Anger)
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Regression analysis results for H1b offer support for the proposed positive relationship
between deontic anger and liberal/accommodating redistributive policies. At p<0.001 there is a
significant positive relationship between deontic anger and support for liberal/accommodating
redistributive policies (b=.200 p=.000). Of the standard control variables, only age (b=-.006
p=.013). Essentially, holding deontic anger constant, younger respondents are more likely than
older respondents to support liberal/accommodating redistributive policies. Other control variables
gender (b=-.054 p=.519), race (b=.030 p=.470), income (b=-.004 p=.860), education (b=.046
p=.112), and region (b=-.031 p=.429) were not statistically significant (Table 3.3).
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Table 3.3: Redistributive Policy Support

Deontic Anger

Coefficient
0.200***

Std. Err.
0.019

Control_Variables
Gender
Age
Education
Income
Race
Region

-0.054
-0.006*
0.046
-0.004
0.030
-0.031

0.084
0.002
0.029
0.025
0.042
0.040

Constant

2.839

0.215

Notes:
OLS_Regression
n = 511, Adjusted R2 = .201
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001

A

second

regression

analysis

testing

the

relationship

between

support

for

liberal/accommodating redistributive policies and deontic anger by condition offers additional
support H1b. Table 3.4 displays output of the interaction between deontic anger and condition.
However, again, because interaction results can be complex to interpret, a marginal effects model
is used to show the relationship between redistributive attitudes and the interaction between
deontic anger and condition. Similar to the immigration attitudes results, compared to the base
condition of Detention Facility, the effect of deontic anger is weaker in the Ceremony frame, as
attitudes are more consistent across deontic anger for individuals who received this frame. For the
three other conditions, as deontic anger increases there is a consistent increase in liberal views
toward redistribution (Figure 3.2).
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Table 3.4: Redistributive Policy Support (Condition x Deontic Anger)
Deontic Anger

Coefficient
0.295***

Std. Err.
0.036

+Condition
Medical Treatment
Ceremony
ICE Raid

-0.025
1.090***
0.565

0.930
0.000
0.023

++Interactions
Condition x Deontic Anger
Medical Treatment
Ceremony
ICE Raid

0.018
-0.172
-0.047

0.745
0.003
0.364

Constant

1.981

0.000

Notes:
OLS_Regression
n = 511, Adjusted R2 = .239
+

=Detention Facility Condition is the base category

++=

Detention Facility x Deontic Anger is the base category
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
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Figure 3.2: Redistributive Policy Support (Condition x Deontic Anger)
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Regression analysis results for H2a offer support for the proposed relationship between
partisanship and liberal/accommodating immigration policies. There is not a significant
relationship between Republicans and support and support for liberal/accommodating immigration
policies. On the other hand, there is a strong positive relationship between identifying as a strong
Democrat and support for liberal/accommodating immigration policies at p<0.05 (b=.202,
p=.012). Of the standard control variables, gender (b=-.055, p=.049), age (b=-.002, p=.001), and
education (b=.020, p=.037) are significant indicating that younger, male respondents with higher
levels of education are more likely to support liberal/accommodating immigration policies than
respondents who are female, older, and with lower levels of education. The variables income
(b=.006, p=.421), region (b=-.009, p=.479), and race (b=.002, p=.891) were not statistically
significant (Table 3.5).
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Table 3.2: Immigration Policy Support (Partisanship x Deontic Anger)
Coefficient

Std. Err.

0.023
0.003
0.220*
-0.019
0.080
0.202**

0.100
0.110
0.112
0.118
0.109
0.08

Deontic Anger

0.051***

0.013

++Interactions
Partisanship x Deontic Anger
2
3
4
5
6
7

-0.000
-0.018
-0.063*
-0.004
-0.024
-0.034

0.025
0.028
0.026
0.025
0.025
0.018

Control Variables
Gender
Race
Income
Education
Region
Age

-0.055*
0.002
0.006
0.020*
-0.009
-0.002**

0.028
0.015
0.008
0.009
0.013
0.001

Constant

0.626

0.082

+Partisanship
2
3
4
5
6
7

Notes:
OLS Regression
n = 479, Adjusted R2 = .123
+Strong
++

Republican is the base category

Strong Republican x Deontic Anger is the base category

* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
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Results of a marginal effects model offer some support for the proposed mitigating effect
of deontic anger on partisanship on individual attitudes toward liberal/accommodating
immigration policies (H2b). Respondents who identify as Strong Democrat are supportive of
liberal/accommodating immigration policies regardless of deontic anger. However, support for
liberal/accommodating immigration policies among those who identify as Strong Republican,
Republican, Lean Republican, Lean Democrat, and Democrat depends on reported deontic anger.
As deontic anger increases among these groups, so does the likelihood of supporting
liberal/accommodating immigration policies. Interestingly, there is a negative relationship
between deontic anger and support for liberal/accommodating immigration policies such that as
deontic anger increases among those who identify as independent, support for those policies
decreases 33 (Figure 3.3).

33

Examining the relationship between independents and policy support is an avenue for future research.
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Figure 3.3: Marginal Effects of Partisanship on Immigration Policy Support
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Regression analysis results for H2c offer support for the proposed relationship between
partisanship and liberal/accommodating redistributive policies. Moving from Strong Republican
(1) to Strong Democrat (7), there is a positive relationship between identification with the
Democratic Party and support for liberal/accommodating redistributive policies. Democrat
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(b=.778, p=.018) is significant at p<0.05, while Lean Democrat (b=1.24, p=.000) and Strong
Democrat (b=1.19, p=.000) are significant at p<0.001. Those who identify as Independent (b=.712,
p=.035) are also statistically significant at p<0.05. Among standard control variables, only age
(b=-.006, p=.010) is statistically significant, indicating that younger respondents are more likely
to support liberal/accommodating redistributive policies than older respondents. The variables
gender (b=.036, p=.667), race (b=.003, p=.935), income (b=-.006, p=.799), education (b=.041,
p=.158), and region (b=-.045, p=.260) were not statistically significant (Table 3.6).
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Table 3.6: Redistributive Policy Support (Partisanship x Deontic Anger)
Coefficient

Std. Err.

0.201
0.182
0.712*
1.249***
0.778*
1.197***

0.301
0.330
0.336
0.355
0.328
0.240

0.291***

0.040

-0.108
-0.126
-0.163*
-0.227**
-0.185*
-0.177**

0.767
0.086
0.079*
0.076**
0.076*
0.054**

Control Variables
Gender
Race
Income
Education
Region
Age

-0.036
0.003
-0.006
0.041
-0.045
-0.006

0.084
0.044
0.025
0.029
0.040
0.002

Constant

2.459

0.248

+Partisanship
2
3
4
5
6
7
Deontic Anger
++Interactions
Partisanship x Deontic Anger
2
3
4
5
6
7

Notes:
OLS Regression
n = 479, Adjusted R2 = .278
+

Strong Republican is the base category

++

Strong Republican x Deontic Anger is the base category
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
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Results of a marginal effects model do not support the proposed mitigating effect of deontic
anger on partisanship on individual attitudes toward liberal/accommodating redistributive policies
(H2d). Even though those respondents who identify as Democrat are more supportive of
liberal/accommodating redistributive policies than those respondents who identify as Republican,
across all partisan identifications as deontic anger increases, so does support for those policies.
Interestingly, deontic anger seems to have the strongest effect among those who identify as Strong
Republican (Figure 3.4).
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Figure 3.4: Marginal Effects of Partisanship on Redistributive Policy Support
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Discussion and Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter is to establish the role of deontic anger in directing support for
liberal accommodating immigration and redistributive policies. The collective findings support the
theoretical premise and the proposed hypotheses. With the exception of the Ceremony condition,
there is a positive relationship between deontic anger and support for liberal/accommodating
immigration and redistributive policies, regardless of partisan attachment. As the findings suggest,
liberal policy support may be stronger among younger respondents, and, in some cases, those who
have higher levels of education. However, other standard control variables such as race, income,
and region are not significant.
Because of the space limitations of a single dissertation chapter, there are some variables
of interest that were omitted by necessity, but that could prove to be of interest for future research.
For example, a case study of groups according to race or class could offer additional insight as to
who experiences the strongest feelings of deontic anger under given conditions. Likewise, since
the Ceremony condition did have a different effect on policy preferences than the other presented
conditions, further exploration of deontic reactions to specific conditions would further
understanding of when deontic anger is triggered.
With regard to literature specific to deontic anger, a future study should focus on the
inclusion of justice beliefs (i.e. “the norms and values that concern the question of how material
goods should be distributed between members of a society”) (Andre and Heien 2001, p. 340).
Justice beliefs are grounded in the equity principles of distributive justice (Deutsch 1975), which
addresses the principle of fairness. Specifically, the “individuals’ right to receive what is fairly
owed to them” (O’Reilly, Aquino, and Skarlicki 2016, p. 172). Since the purpose of a redistributive
policy is to determine how goods are “distributed between members of a society” (Andre and
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Heien 2001, p. 340), there are theoretical reasons to believe that individual justice beliefs could
have a mitigating effect on policy preferences.
The next chapter of this dissertation will present the final empirical analysis. The
expectation for the fourth chapter is that deontic anger will affect political behavior in the same
way that it affects policy preferences. Essentially, when deontic anger is triggered the deontic
response will elicit a specific political behavior that restores justice to a moral violation of unfair
treatment. The final chapter, the fifth chapter, with discuss further research related to the findings
in this dissertation.
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IV. THE EFFECT OF DEONTIC ANGER ON CHARITABLE DONATIONS

Introduction

Thus far, the findings in this dissertation indicate a positive relationship between deontic
anger and liberal political attitudes toward immigration policies and redistributive policies.
Essentially, the likelihood of supporting liberal immigration policies and liberal redistributive
policies increases as an individual reports feeling higher levels of deontic anger in relation to
images that portray immigrants as being treated unfairly. Based on the results from Chapter 3,
these findings are consistent across three of the four framed conditions and regardless of an
individual’s attachment to a political party. Further, the results meet the theoretical expectations
that suggest there is a significant relationship between deontic anger and political attitudes (e.g.
Leiserowitz 2006; Myers, Nisbet, Maibach, and Leiserowitz 2012).
Having established that deontic anger plays a significant role in political attitudes, the
purpose of this chapter is to examine deontic anger in relation to political behavior. As explained
in Chapter 2 of this dissertation, deontic anger is a negative emotion. Theoretically, negative
emotions are more likely than positive emotions to motivate political behavior. This is because
“individuals do not merely passively experience emotions; they also try to regulate those emotions
by increasing pleasant emotions and decreasing unpleasant ones like anxiety” (Albertson and
Kushner Gadarian 2015, p. 9).
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Further, anger specifically influences “some people to participate in ways they might ordinarily
not – even if they have the ability and opportunity to do so” (Valentino 2011, p. 168).
In terms of this dissertation, which focuses on deontic anger, the results reported in Chapter
3 indicate that an individual who experiences deontic anger in response to the perceived unfair
treatment of an immigrant is likely to support immigration and redistributive policies that would
be accommodating to an immigrant group. Given the previously reviewed literature on deontic
anger, a reasonable assumption is that those who report high deontic anger support
liberal/accommodating immigration and redistributive policies (both of which potentially benefit
the group that has been mistreated) as a way of restoring justice (Batson et al. 2007). Essentially,
by supporting policies that benefit an abused group, the perceived moral violation of unfairness is
countered and justice is restored.
This chapter builds on the findings in Chapter 3, which indicate a significant relationship
between deontic anger and political attitudes, to examine the extent to which deontic anger has an
effect on political behavior. Studies on political participation seek to explain why people do or do
not participate in political life. Broadly speaking, “Political participation refers to the activities of
the mass public in politics, including, for example, voting in elections, helping a political
campaign, giving money to a candidate or cause, writing or calling officials, petitioning,
boycotting, demonstrating, and working with other people on issues” (Uhlaner 2015, p. 504).
For this chapter, the political behavior of interest is the choice to make charitable donations.
Donations were chosen because, like a violation of societal norms and values could trigger deontic
anger, the decision to make a charitable donation could be linked to the desire to uphold similar
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norms and values (Bekkers and Weipking 2011). This chapter first proceeds by reviewing the
established mechanisms that motivate an individual’s decision to contribute to a charitable
organization: 1) awareness of need, 2) solicitation, 3) costs and benefits, 4) altruism, 5) reputation
6) psychological benefits, 7) values, and 8) efficacy (Bekkers and Weipking 2011). The discussion
of extant literature is necessary for understanding how it fits within the existing framework of
literature on giving. Next, because extant literature suggests a relationship between partisan
attachment and donation behavior (e.g. Margolis and Sances 2017), there will be a discussion of
an expected relationship between partisanship and the likelihood of making a charitable donation.
This chapter will conclude with empirical analyses testing the relationship between deontic anger
the likelihood of making a charitable contribution.
Charitable Donation Literature Review
Awareness of Need
Awareness of need simply suggests that potential charitable donors are aware that the need
for a charitable donation to meet a specific need for a specific group of people is present (Bekkers
and Weipling 2011). Potential donors may be aware of need through personal connection to a
needy victim (Small and Simonsohn 2006) or through mediums such as solicitation34 (Dolinski,
Gryzb, Olejnik, Prusakowski, and Urban 2005) and mass media35 (Simon 1997; Adams 1986;
Bennett and Kottasz 2000). The knowledge that a need exists is the necessary motivation for some
individuals to make a charitable donation. Since deontic anger is triggered through the observation
of unfair treatment (Beugre 2010), awareness of need could be considered a component of deontic

34

Solicitation refers to requests for donations that are tangible (such as a fundraising letter) or intangible (i.e.
personal requests) (Bekkers and Weipking 2011).
35
Mass media raises awareness of need through extensive coverage of specific events such as relief appeals
following natural disasters (Bekkers and Weipking 2011).

79

anger. While solicitation or mass media are not necessary for a deontic reaction to be triggered,
scenarios presented through either of these mediums could bring third party abuse to the attention
of an individual.
Altruism
Theoretically, someone may offer a charitable contribution with altruistic motives.
According to the altruism model (e.g. Andreoni 1989, 1990), “giving is mostly supply-driven, and
that it is utility-maximizing for the giver to give. Under this model, donations unambiguously
enhance the giver’s utility as well as societal welfare” (Della Vigna, List, and Malmendier 2012,
p. 2). In other words, people may make charitable donations simply because they care about a
specific organization or the beneficiaries. One notable theory supporting altruistic behavior is the
“crowding out” effect. Essentially, donors increase or decrease their spending in direct correlation
to the known contributions of other donors or of governmental support (Kingma 1989). Other
studies on altruism find no support for crowding out (Brooks 2003; Diamond 1999; Hughes and
Luksetich 1999; Khanna et al. 1995; Khanna and Sandler 2000; Okten and Weisbrod 2000; Schiff
1985, 1990); however, the underlying premise of altruism is the same. Altruistic donors are willing
to give when an organization or beneficiary whom they care about is in need. In addition, this “joy
of giving” (Andreoni 1989) associated with altruism may serve to offer psychological benefits
such as boosting a person’s self-image (Bekkers and Weipking 2011).
As explained in Chapter 2, the behavior associated with deontic anger is different from
altruism in that while altruistic behavior may serve some benefit to “self” (i.e. the “joy of giving”)
the sole intention of deontic anger is to do “what one ought to do” (Bucciarelli and Johnson-Laird
2005) simply because doing so is “right.” Thus, the present understanding of why people give in
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terms of caring does not take into account the potential for perceived moral violations that is
proposed by the theory of deontic justice (Folger 1998, 2001).
Cost/Benefit Analysis
The tangible cost of donating is another factor in the decision to make a charitable donation.
In the cost/benefit analysis of giving, the perceived benefit that the donor gains must be greater
than the cost of the donation (Bekkers and Weipking 2011). In short, according to Bekkers and
Weipking (2011), giving may be tied to the extent to which a donor perceives that the personal
benefit, such as feeling the “joy of giving” (Andreoni 1989), is not greater than the personal loss
of tangible goods, such as money.
Since the theoretical premise of this chapter is that deontic anger motivates the decision to
make a charitable donation, the survey experiment for this chapter, which will be explained in
detail in the methodology section, accounts for the tangible cost of giving. Respondents who took
the survey, were offered a monetary stipend, and they were asked if they wanted to donate a portion
of that stipend to one of three charities. The intention of offering the stipend was to provide an
opportunity to donate without asking the respondent to take away from their existing personal
finances, thereby potentially decreasing the cost associated with donating and increasing the
likelihood of donating as a deontic reaction.
Reputation
Reputation is another benefit that may be derived from charitable giving. Generally
speaking, charitable giving is perceived favorably by society (Charities Aid Foundation 2005;
Horne 2003; Muehleman, Bruker, and Ingram 1976), and, so, giving to charity is likely to lead to
social approval (Muehlman et al. 1976; Wiepking 2008). In terms of using charitable donations to
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gain a favorable social reputation, findings suggest that “when given the choice, people generally
prefer their donations to be known by others” (Bekkers and Weipking 2011, p. 937).
The survey experiment for this chapter accounts for the effect of social desirability by
making the donation option at the end of the survey anonymous. After viewing the episodic frames
as explained in Chapter 2, respondents were given the option to make a charitable donation to an
immigration related organization. Since the survey was taken anonymously, the decision to make
a donation with the stipend is without recognition, meaning, in this case, the decision to make a
charitable donation should be related to deontic anger and not reputation.
Values
Someone may also choose to make a charitable contribution simply because a specific
cause aligns with their specific value system. For those who prefer that others know that they have
made a donation, the intention could serve to signal to others what the donor’s values are (Bekkers
and Weipking 2011) as much as is to build personal reputation as one who donates. As for the
causal mechanism of values, the essence of a value system as causal mechanism for making a
charitable donation is “moving the world in a desired direction” (Bekkers and Weipking 2011, p.
942). This differs from deontic anger, as deontic anger is a response to violation of a societal norm
(e.g. Bucciarelli and Johnson-Laird 2005). Essentially, while the intended outcome of acting on
personal values is to further a specific cause, the intended outcome of acting on deontic anger is
simply to restore justice.
Efficacy
Finally, evidence supports a proposed relationship between a donor’s sense of efficacy and
charitable donation behavior. When donors believe that a charitable organization will use their
82

donations to make a difference to donation recipients, they are more likely to give than when they
do not believe that the organization will use their donations to make a difference to donation
recipients (Arumi et al. 2005; Diamond and Kashyap 1997; Duncan 2004; Mathur 1996; Radley
and Kennedy 1992; Smith and McSweeney 2007). Although someone who donates as a result of
experiencing deontic anger might want their donation to make a difference to the donation
recipient, the motivation for donating is restorative justice. Efficacy could be used as a main
dependent variable or a control variable in an analysis of deontic anger. However, including both
efficacy and deontic anger in the same analysis could make the results difficult to empirically
disentangle. As such, efficacy will be considered for future studies, but is excluded from the
analysis section of this chapter.
Emotions and Charitable Donations
Beyond the previously explained mechanisms behind donation behavior (Bekkers and
Weipking 2011), there is evidence that negative emotions have some effect on donation behavior
(Dillard and Peck 2000). Charitable organizations often structure donation appeals in a way that
evokes negative emotions such as sadness, fear, or tension (Bagozzi and Moore 1994) in potential
donors. These negative emotions are shown to evoke an empathetic response, which subsequently
increases the likelihood of donations (for more on the “empathy-helping” hypothesis see Bagozzi
and Moore 1994; Fisher, Vandenbosch, and Antia 2008). According to extant literature, the desire
to help in response to a negative emotion could be because “a person experiencing negative affect
has a need or motive to feel better and sees helping others as a way to do this. That is, helping
others is viewed as rewarding because either it is seen as a way to receive social recognition or it
is intrinsically self-rewarding” (Bagozzi and Moore 1994, p. 60).
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However, according to the theory of deontic justice (Folger 1998, 2001), a reward of helping others
through prosocial behaviors that benefit a targeted victim could also be the restored justice in
response to the moral violation of perceived unfairness (Priesemuth 2013).
Deontic Reaction as Prosocial Behavior
Based on extant literature, a deontic reaction that results from deontic anger could manifest
in more than one way. According to Priesemuth (2013, p. 650)
Research has shown that observing abuse of another person elicits moral unease and
deontic reactions in people, such as anger and moral outrage. These deontic reactions
prompt people to initiate restorative justice behaviors in which the witness of injustice
tends to either punish the transgressor (O’Reilly and Aquino 2011; Skarlicki and Rupp
2010; Turillo, Folger, Lavelle, Umphress and Gee 2002), refrain from any action at all
(Rupp and Bell 2010, withdraw from the situation, or engage in constructive resistance
(Greenbaum, Bardes, Mayer and Priesemuth 2009, 2011).

As explained in Chapter 2, the expectation is that a deontic reaction will lead to behavior
that seeks to restore justice through behavior that benefits a targeted victim (e.g. Priesemuth 2013;
Priesemuth and Schminke 2019) rather than retaliation, resistance, or withdrawal. As stated, each
of the potential behaviors are intended to correct for moral unease that is brought about from
witnessing injustice. However, a retaliatory response (i.e. punishing the transgressor) is more
likely to be a result of personal anger than deontic anger. Unlike deontic anger, personal anger is
a threat to “self” (Batson et al. 2007). Extant literature suggests that when the self is threatened, a
provoked anger response leads to a greater likelihood that the offended person will seek to punish
the offender (de Quervain et al. 2004; O’Gorman, Wilson, and Miller 2005). Further, to resist or
to withdraw does not work to actively restore justice to a victim in the way that prosocial behavior
does.
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In terms of this chapter, contributions, which can be considered a form of prosocial
behavior, is the dependent variable of interest. Prosocial behavior is defined as “actions perceived
by organizational members as benefiting others” (Winterich, Aquino, Mittal, and Swartz 2013, p.
759). Findings suggest that there is a positive relationship between perceived injustice, such as that
associated with moral outrage (i.e. deontic anger), and the likelihood of participating in prosocial
activities (Hoffman 1989; Piliavin et al. 1969; Montada and Schneider 1989). Specifically noted
behaviors are spending money (e.g. making a charitable donation), signing a petition addressed to
political leaders or institutions, participation in a demonstration, and joining an activity group
(Montada and Schneider 1989), as well as actions such as donating blood, human rights activism,
or silent marches (Lodewijkx, Kersten, and Van Zomeren 2008; Skitka and Mullen 2002). As
explained in Chapter 2, deontic anger is taken from business literature. As such, this chapter uses
Priesemuth’s (2013) and Priesemuth and Schminke’s (2019) respective studies on prosocial
reactions to abusive supervision to offer specific examples of how deontic anger could lead to
prosocial behavior, as opposed to the other noted behaviors, as a restorative measure.
Even though the survey experiment for this chapter was not administered in a workplace,
the premise of fairness theory is still applicable. Fairness theory is rooted in the perception that the
expectation of an environment is fair treatment, and a core democratic value of the United States
is equality.36 Thus, the theoretical premise of the reviewed studies is generalizable to the
experiment conducted for this chapter.

36

Core democratic values are the fundamental beliefs and constitutional principles of American society, which
unite all Americans. These values are expressed in the Declaration of Independence, the United States Constitution
and other significant documents, speeches, and writing of the nation.
(CIVITAS: A Framework for Civic Education, a collaborative project of the Center for Civic Education and the Council
for the Advancement of Citizenship, National Council for the Social Studies Bulletin No. 86, 1991.)
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Priesemuth (2013) examines third-party reactions to observed abuse in the workplace.
More specifically, the extent to which prosocial behavior is exhibited in response to the perception
of unfair treatment of a coworker. For the study, participants were randomly assigned to either one
of two high observed abusive scenarios or one of two low observed abuse scenarios. The main
variables of interest for the study were moral courage 37 and friendship as independent variables,
and prosocial behavior as the dependent variable. Prosocial behavior was measured using six items
indicating the willingness of the respondent “to side with or stand up for the target of abuse”
(Priesemuth 2013, p. 52). The results indicate a direct and positive relationship between observed
abusive supervision and “standing up behavior” (b=.21, p<.05). While moral courage was not
significant, friendship with the victim does increase the likelihood of prosocial behavior. 38
To measure third-party responses to injustice, Priesemuth and Schminke (2019) conduct
two experiments assessing employee reactions upon witnessing the behavior of an abusive
supervisor toward a coworker. Drawing on fairness theory (Folger and Cropanzano 1998, 2001),
the authors argue that when employees believe that a workplace environment is fair, observers of
injustice in that workplace may “be more likely to respond in prosocial ways because such
reactions are more in accordance with these supported and expected values and norms of fairness”
(Priesemuth and Schminke 2019, p. 1235). Further, “Fairness theory contends that a fair work
environment demonstrates a level of social support for fair and ethical behavior” (Priesemuth and
Schminke 2019, p. 1235).

37

Moral courage was measured using a six-item scale taken from Sekerka, Bagozzi, and Charnigo (2009). The scale
assesses the extent to which an individual is willing to take moral action, even when that action could result in
negative consequences. Moral courage will be further discussed as a control variable.
38
The episodic frames used for this dissertation depict immigrants. The survey respondents are not expected have
a personal relationship with the individuals in the scenarios, and so friendship is not measured in this study.
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The authors’ study consisted of adult employees answering survey questions regarding their work
places through secure online websites, and the supervisors of those employees responding to a
separate survey.
Questions in the survey measured observed abusive supervision, overall justice, deontic
reactions, ethical efficacy, and coworker protective behavior. Overall, the authors find support for
the proposed role of fairness in prosocial behavior. Significant results indicate that when deontic
anger is triggered, the relationship between observed abuse and prosocial behavior is stronger
when the employee believes the work environment is fair. Additionally, the relationship is
mediated by ethical efficacy, meaning that employees who work in a fair environment believe that
they can and should help a victimized coworker.
In relation to this chapter, the finding of interest is the significant relationship between
observed abuse and prosocial behavior. This is not to dismiss the importance of the control
variables. However, the purpose of this dissertation is to establish the direct relationship between
deontic anger and political attitudes and behavior. While moderating variables such as moral
courage, friendship, and ethical efficacy are relevant for future studies, a main purpose of this
chapter is to explore the direct relationship between deontic anger and political behavior. Based
on extant literature, as well as what is a reasonable measure for the experiment that will be
explained, the political behavior of interest is contributions in the way of making a charitable
donation. Thus, I posit the following hypothesis:
H1: There is a positive and direct relationship between deontic anger and donation behavior.

Deontic
Anger

Donation
Behavior
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The Interactive Effect of Partisanship
As previously stated, because the intention of this chapter to is to establish the relationship
between deontic anger and political behavior, moderating variables that have been used in business
literature are excluded from the present study. However, significant variables in the realm of
political science should be addressed. Even though space limitations do not allow for the
exploration of all potential moderating or control variables, the importance of partisanship in
directing both political and apolitical behavior cannot be overlooked.
Regarding partisanship, Margolis and Sances (2017, p. 840) write:
Not only does a person’s political outlook shape views of political events, but it also
corresponds to decisions about where to live (Bishop and Cushing 2008), what to buy
(Nunberg 2006), what television programs to watch (Vavreck 2011), and even what to
name children (Oliver et al. 2016).

According to findings in a study conducted by the authors, there are also significant
partisan differences in charitable giving (Margolis and Sances 2017). The study examines three
underlying mechanisms that motivate differences in partisan giving of charitable donations:
religious identity, signaling ideological beliefs, and the communication of economic status. Results
indicate “that conservatives give about $160 more to charity than liberals, all else equal” (Margolis
and Sances 2017, p. 847). The authors further write:
Yet we do not find that partisans differ in their charitable giving as a means of
demonstrating their policy viewpoints or economic status. Instead, differences in charitable
giving appear to arise due to social differences, specifically differences in religious
identities, between partisans (p. 860).
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Regardless of the underlying motivation for differences in charitable giving, there is a predictable
partisan difference. In this chapter, partisanship is expected to have a mitigating effect on
charitable giving. Based on the empirical evidence from Chapter 3, and as stated in H1, deontic
anger is expected to have a direct and positive effect on donation behavior. However, given the
reviewed literature on partisanship and charitable giving, at equal levels of reported deontic anger,
Republicans are more likely to make a charitable donation than Democrats. Contrary to Chapter
3, the strength of partisan attachment is not expected to have an effect, as the reviewed empirical
evidence suggests that the decision to donate has social rather than ideological implications.
H2: At equal levels of reported deontic anger, Republicans are more likely than Democrats to
donate to a charitable organization.
H3: Partisanship mitigates the effect of deontic anger on making a charitable donation

Methodology
A survey experiment examines the positive relationship between deontic anger and
donation behavior. A survey was chosen as this is the established methodology in political science
for measuring both emotional responses (e.g. Gross 2008) and charitable giving (e.g. Margolis and
Sances 2017).
As with any methodology, there are some limitations. For one, this survey experiment
consists of a cross-sectional analysis, meaning individual preferences are only considered at one
point in time. In other words, this study does not have access to the causality of information that a
time-series analysis would offer. Additionally, this study does not have the in-depth perspective
that would be available through the use of interviews. On the other hand, because of the large
sample size, a survey experiment offers the highest potential for generalizability, and so this
methodology is adequate for this dissertation.
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Survey Design
Authors such as Margolis and Sances (2017) have used survey data collected from national
surveys, such as the Social Capital Benchmark Survey (SCCBS) and the General Social Survey
(GSS) to measure individual charitable giving. While these sources are an accurate measure, they
do not measure giving in response to specific emotions. Thus, data for the analyses comes from an
independent survey experiment that uses episodic frames to evoke emotional responses (Iyengar
1991).39 The survey consists of the same four treatment conditions and one control condition as
the survey that was administered on Lucid to collect data for chapters 2 and 3. To ensure even
distribution, the dispersion of the treatment and control conditions for the survey is randomized
among respondents. Respondents who received a treatment condition were first shown an episodic
frame, followed by questions pertaining to that specific frame.
The overall purpose of the survey is to measure the relationship between deontic anger and
donation behavior. The intention of the control condition in the survey is to measure the likelihood
of making a charitable donation in the absence of deontic anger. The survey was administered
through the third-party platform Mechanical Turk (MTurk) in March of 2020. The total number of
responses was 1,304. The episodic frames, the accompanying descriptive text, and the measure of
deontic anger used in the survey were identical to the Lucid survey explained in Chapter 2.
Of the four treatment conditions, two are considered low-abuse frames and two are
considered high-abuse frames. In Chapter 2, the frames were used to establish the relationship
between third party perceptions of abuse and deontic anger. Findings from the chapter indicate
that respondents who perceive a frame as abusive toward an immigrant report higher levels of

39

The justification for using episodic frames is in the methodology section of Chapter 2.
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deontic anger than respondents who do not perceive a frame as abusive toward an immigrant.
Based on these findings, the assumption of this chapter is that the those who report high levels of
deontic anger also perceive their given frame as abusive. Additionally, like the survey that was
administered on Lucid, the MTurk survey asks respondents whether the treatment of the immigrant
in a given frame is fair or unfair. Findings from Chapter 2 indicate that those who perceive that a
given frame is unfair score higher in observed abuse than those who do not perceive a given frame
as unfair. Thus, the assumption of the analyses in this chapter is that respondents who report high
deontic anger also perceive a given frame as unfair.40
Consistent with the analysis in Chapter 3, deontic anger (mean=3.827, SD=2.213) and
partisanship (mean=4.449, SD=2.210) are the main independent variables of interest. The
dependent variable of interest is donation behavior. At the end of the survey, respondents were
given the following prompt:
You will be receiving compensation in the amount of $0.40 along with a bonus amount of
$0.25. Consider whether you would like to donate any of your bonus amount to ONE of
the following organizations. The researchers will make a private donation to each
organization upon completion of this project.
Response options were as follows: 1) Amnesty International (a non-profit, non-partisan
organization that supports human rights), 2) Center for Immigration Studies (an immigration
organization that promotes a low-immigration vision), 3) International Rescue Committee (an
immigration organization that promotes the resettlement of refugees), and 4) I would NOT like to
donate any portion of my bonus amount of $0.25.
Although the organizations were not identified in the survey as liberal or conservative, the
description of each was intended to appeal to specific respondents. Considering the potential effect

40

The full description of the survey items is found in Appendix E.
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of partisanship, partisanship, not deontic anger, is expected to affect which organization a
respondent chooses. However, once the organization is chosen, deontic anger is expected to affect
the likelihood of donating to that organization. Since Amnesty International was noted to be nonpartisan, the expectation is that a higher number of independents than Democrats or Republicans
will donate to this organization. The implication of the Center for Immigration Studies’ lowimmigration vision is that the organization does not hold a liberal/accommodating stance on
immigration, and so more Republicans than Democrats or independents are expected to donate to
this organization. Lastly, because the International Rescue Committee is noted to be an
immigration organization that promotes the resettlement of refugees, the implication is that this
organization holds a liberal/accommodating stance on immigration. As such, more Democrats than
Republicans or independents are expected to donate to this organization.
For respondents who chose to donate to one of the organizations, an additional item asks
the respondent if they would like to visit that organization’s website, and also if the respondent
would like to share the website on social media. The full item description is detailed in the
appendix. Respondents who chose not to donate to one of the organizations were directed to an
item asking if they would like to sign an immigration related petition(s), and also if the respondent
would like to share that they signed the petition(s) on social media.
The analysis examines donation behavior in several ways. First, as previously explained,
following the questions that measure deontic anger, respondents are asked if they would like to
make a donation to one of three immigration related organizations. Regardless of which
organization was chosen, donation1 is a binary variable coded as 0=No (n=728) and 1=Yes (n=374)
(mean=.339, SD=.473). However, respondents who chose to donate were directed to an item
asking whether they wanted to visit the website for the chosen organization (mean=.575,
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SD=.949). As indicated by the variable donation2, 107 respondents chose Amnesty International,
30 respondents chose Center for Immigration Studies, and 62 respondents chose International
Rescue Committee.
Respondents who elected to donate were asked to manually enter their donation amount.
Per the item instructions, respondents were expected to denote a number that was a portion of their
$.25 bonus amount. However, the format in which respondents entered their donation amount was
inconsistent. For example, some respondents used symbols such as a decimal or percentage sign
while others did not. Further, some respondents entered an amount that was higher than the
designated bonus amount. As such, accurate descriptive statistics for the appropriate range of the
donation amount variable are difficult to determine, and the donation amount is not included in the
analysis for this chapter.
Along with the standard demographics as explained in Chapter 2, the main control
variables for this survey are moral courage (mean=4.349, SD=1.018), moral identity
(mean=5.922, SD=1.158), and welfare chauvinism (mean=2.895, SD=1.070). Both moral courage
and moral identity are variables taken from business literature on deontic reactions in the
workplace. The variable welfare chauvinism is taken from political science literature on
redistribution, and, for the analyses in this chapter, it is also used as a control. Although these three
variables could be significant when used as moderators or the main independent variable of
interest, the purpose of this chapter is to further explore deontic anger. As such, for this chapter,
moral courage, moral identity, and welfare chauvinism will only be used as control variables in
the analyses.
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Moral Courage
Moral courage is an individual’s willingness to behave morally regardless of potential
threats “such as humiliation, ridicule, loss of social standing, and unemployment” (Priesemuth
2013, p. 655). Additionally, “People engaging in these moral behaviors are thought to be equipped
with higher levels of moral courage” (Priesemuth 2013, p. 655) Thus, the extent to which an
individual who observes abuse will be motivated to compensate the victim is likely related to the
strength of that individual’s moral courage.
The variable moral courage is adapted from Priesemuth et al. (2013), and it is a construct
of three items administered on the MTurk survey. The following three items are measured on a 7point Likert scale ranging from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 7 (Strongly Agree): 1) When I encounter
an ethical challenge I take it on with moral action, regardless of how it may pose a negative impact
on how others see me, 2) When my job record may be affected negatively, I am unlikely to get
involved in an ethical challenge, and 3) I am the type of person who wants to keep things subdued,
not raise issues, or put myself or others in jeopardy by bringing a moral issue forward.
Moral Identity
In terms of behavior, findings also suggest that the decision to act on moral violations may
be moderated by an individual’s moral identity (Aquino and Reed 2002). Moral identity is defined
as “the degree to which being a moral person is important to a person’s identity” (Hardy and Carlo
2011, p. 212), or “The mental representation of one’s moral character held internally as a cognitive
schema, and expressed to others externally through one’s actions” (Winterich, Aquino, Mittal, and
Swartz 2013, p. 759). As Damon and Hart (1984, p. 455) write, “There are both theoretical and
empirical reasons to believe that the centrality of morality to self may be the single most powerful
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determiner of concordance between moral judgment and conduct . . . People whose self-concept
is organized around their moral beliefs are highly likely to translate those beliefs into action
consistently throughout their lives” (Aquino and Reed 2002, p. 1424). Likewise, “O’Reilly and
Aquino (2011) argued that third parties whose moral identity is more central to their overall selfdefinition experience higher levels of moral anger when they learn about others being mistreated
than third parties whose moral identity is less central to their self-definition” (O’Reilly, Aquino,
and Skarlicki 2015, p. 172).
The variable moral identity is adopted from Aquino and Reed (2002), and it is a construct
of five items administered on the MTurk survey. The five items are measured on a 7-point Likert
scale ranging from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 7 (Strongly Agree). Before giving a response to the
items, respondents were given the following prompt:
Listed below are some characteristics that may describe a person.
Caring, Compassionate, Fair, Friendly, Generous, Hardworking, Helpful, Honest,
and Kind
The person with these characteristics could be you or it could be someone else. For a
moment, visualize in your mind the kind of person who has these characteristics. Imagine
how that person would think, feel, and act. When you have a clear image of what this
person would be like, answer the following questions.

The five items are as follows: 1) It would make me feel good to be a person who has these
characteristics, 2) Being someone who has these characteristics is an important part of who
I am, 3) I would not be ashamed to be a person who has these characteristics, 4) Having
these characteristics is really important to me, and 5) I strongly desire to have these
characteristics.
Welfare Chauvinism
“Welfare chauvinism” deems that rather than opposing redistribution as a whole, some
Americans believe that only citizens are entitled to redistributive benefits (Kolbe and Crepaz
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2016). As Kolbe and Crepaz (2016, p. 106) write, “In a study of twenty-three countries, van
Oorschot finds that along a dimension of ‘deservingness’ immigrants came last, after the elderly,
the sick and disabled, and the unemployed, suggesting that the publics feel little solidarity with
immigrants.” However, there is evidence to suggest that chauvinistic attitudes toward
redistribution are not directly related to xenophobia or racism, but rather, feelings of fairness (e.g.
Kolbe and Crepaz 2016; Koning 2011). Essentially, a native-born American’s failure to prioritize
immigrants as welfare recipients may be strongly related to the monetary amount that the
immigrant has potentially paid into the welfare system.
The variable welfare chauvinism is adapted from Kolbe and Crepaz (2016). The item
consists of the following question: “Thinking of people coming to live in the USA from other
countries, when do you think they should obtain the same rights to social benefits and services as
citizens already living here?” Item responses are as follows: 1) immediately on arrival, 2) after
living in the USA for a year, whether or not they have worked, 3) only after they have worked and
paid taxes for at least a year, and 4) only once they become a USA citizen 5) they should never get
the same rights.
Results
The first part of the analysis examines if respondents choose to donate any part of their
bonus. Given the dichotomous coding of the donation variable, a logistic regression analysis was
used to examine the relationship between deontic anger and donation behavior, and to determine
whether standard demographics and the previously explained control variables affect the proposed
relationship. Findings offer support for H1. There is a significantly significant and positive
relationship between deontic anger and making a charitable donation (b=.184, p=0.000). Of the
control variables, only education was statistically significant (b=.219, p=0.006) indicating that
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respondents with higher education levels are more likely to make a charitable donation than
respondents with lower education levels. The variables age (b=-.012, p=.101), race (b=-.054,
p=.465), income (b=-.050, p=.416), gender (b=-.145, p=.454), moral courage (b=.045, p=.612),
moral identity (b=.157, p=.088), and welfare chauvinism (b=.159, p=.070) are not statistically
significant (Table 4.1).

Table 4.1: The Effect of Deontic Anger on Charitable Donations

Deontic Anger

Coefficient
0.184***

Std.
Err.
0.046

Control Variables
Moral Courage
Moral Identity
Welfare Chauvinism

0.045
0.157
0.159

0.089
0.092
0.087

Gender
Race
Income
Education
Age

-0.145
-0.054
-0.050
0.219**
-0.012

0.194
0.074
0.062
0.079
0.007

Constant

-3.176

0.825

Notes:
Logistic Regression
n = 54641, Pseudo R2 = .068
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001

A second logistic regression interacting deontic anger with the framed conditions offers
additional support for H1. Table 4.2 displays output of the interaction between deontic anger and

41

The number of randomized respondents who viewed the control condition of No Picture(n=530) in the survey
resulted in an n that is smaller than the total number of respondents.
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condition. However, because interaction results can be complex to interpret, predicted probabilities
are used to show the substantive relationship between donation behavior and the interaction
between deontic anger and condition (Figure 4.1). Deontic anger is still significant (b=.374,
p=.002). When compared to the condition of Detention Facility, only the Medical Treatment
condition is significant at p<0.05 (b=-.303, p=.044). Neither the Ceremony condition (b=-.214,
p=.191) nor the ICE Raid condition (b=-.147, p=.344) were significant. Of the control variables,
only education (b=.219, p=.006) was statistically significant indicating that respondents with
higher levels of education are more likely to make a charitable donation than respondents with
lower levels of education. The variables moral courage (b=.030, p=.736), moral identity (b=.144,
p=.128), welfare chauvinism (b=.148, p=.096), age (b=-.013, p=.085), race (b=-.056, p=.448),
income (b=.047, p=.451), and gender (b=-.164, p=.405) were not statistically significant.
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Table 4.2: The Effect of Deontic Anger on Charitable Giving (Deontic Anger x Condition)

Deontic Anger

Coefficient
.374**

Std.
Err.
0.118

+Condition
Medical Treatment
Ceremony
ICE Raid

1.337
1.071
0.676

0.828
0.742
0.795

++Interactions
Condition x Deontic Anger
Medical Treatment
Ceremony
ICE Raid

-0.303*
-0.214
-0.147

0.150
0.163
0.156

Control Variables
Moral Courage
Moral Identity
Welfare Chauvinism

0.030
0.144
0.148

0.090
0.094
0.089

Age
Race
Income
Education
Gender

-0.013
-0.056
-0.047
0.219**
-0.164

0.008
0.074
0.062
0.080
0.197

Constant

-3.868

0.991

Notes:
Logistic Regression
n = 546, Pseudo R2 = .076
+

Detention Facility is the base category
Detention Facility x Deontic Anger is the base
category
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
++
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Figure 4.1: Predicted Probabilities (Deontic Anger x Condition)
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Predicted probabilities do not support H2. At lower levels of deontic anger, Democrats are
more likely than Republicans to make a charitable donation. However, for those respondents who
score higher than the mean of deontic anger (mean=3.827, SD=2.213), Republicans are more likely
to make a charitable donation than Democrats. Therefore, at equal levels of deontic anger,
Republicans are more likely to make a charitable donation at higher levels, while Democrats and
independents are more likely to make a charitable donation at lower levels of deontic anger.
Among the control variables for the analysis, education was statistically significant
(b=.221, p=.008) and moral identity was marginally significant (b=.193, p=.052). The implication
is that holding deontic anger constant, respondents with higher levels of education who are more
likely to consider moral identity to be central to their persona, are more likely to make a charitable
donation than respondents with lower levels of education and who are less likely to consider moral
identity to be central to their persona. The variables moral courage (b=.000, p=.999), welfare
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chauvinism (b=.168, p=.077), age (b=.014, p=.082), race (b=-.059, p=.452), income (b=-.041,
p=5.34), and gender (b=-.189, p=.363) were not statistically significant (Table 4.3 and Figure 4.2).
However, the model does support the proposed mitigating effect of partisanship on the
relationship between deontic anger and donation behavior (H3). Moving from Strong Republican
to Strong Democrat, there is a mitigating effect of partisanship on the relationship between deontic
anger and donation behavior. Overall, among those who identify as Republican, donating to a
charitable organization is motivated by deontic anger. This finding is consistent regardless of the
strength of attachment to the Republican Party. However, among those who identify as
independent or Democrat, the effect of deontic anger on making a charitable donation is negligible.
Thus, the relationship between deontic anger and making a charitable donation is stronger among
Republicans than Democrats (Table 4.3 and Figure 4.2).
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Table 4.3: The Moderating Effect of Partisanship (Partisanship x Deontic Anger)
Coefficient
.617***

Std.
Err.
0.17

2
3
4
5
6
7

0.408
-0.019
1.744
1.997*
1.355
2.305**

0.968
1.406
1.038
0.933
0.852
0.815

2
3
4
5
6
7

-0.221
-0.185
-0.639**
-0.497*
-0.411*
-0.594**

0.232
0.336
0.243
0.214
0.200
0.186

Control Variables
Moral Courage
Moral Identity
Welfare Chauvinism

0.000
0.193*
0.168

0.097
0.099
0.095

Age
Race
Income
Education
Gender

-0.014
-0.059
-0.041
0.221**
-0.189

0.008
0.079
0.066
0.082
0.208

Constant

-4.578

1.120

Deontic Anger

+Partisanship

++Interactions
Partisanship x Deontic Anger

Notes:
Logistic Regression
n = 522, Pseudo R2 = .108
+

Strong Republican is the base category
Strong Republican x Deontic Anger is the base
category
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
++
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Figure 4.2: The Moderating Effect of Partisanship (Partisanship x Deontic Anger)
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Website Donation
In choosing a donation option, No Donation was chosen by the highest number of
respondents (n=373, 65%). Amnesty (AI), the non-partisan organization, was the organization
chosen by the highest number of respondents (n=107, 19%). Following Amnesty, the International
Rescue Committee (IRC), the liberal organization, was chosen by the second highest number of
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respondents (n=62, 11%). Lastly, the Center for Immigration Studies (CIS), the conservative
organization, was chosen by the least number of respondents (n=30, 5%).
Using multinomial logit, Table 4 shows a significant positive relationship between deontic
anger and the likelihood of donating to a specific organization for all respondents. For Amnesty
International (b=.220, p=0.000), Center for Immigration Studies (b=.284, p=0.002), and
International Rescue Committee (b=.266, p=0.000) deontic anger is statistically significant. Table
4.4 and Table 4.5 show the interactive effect of partisanship and deontic anger on donation.
Table 4.4: The Effect of Deontic Anger on Donations by Organization
AI

CIS

IRC

Deontic Anger
Coefficient
Std. Err.

0.220**** 0.284*** 0.266***
0.052
0.092
0.066

Constant

-2.119

-3.678

-2.867

Notes:
Multinomial Logit Regression
n = 568, Pseudo R2 = .032
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
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Table 4.5: The Effect of Deontic Anger on Donations by Organization (Partisanship x Deontic
Anger)

Deontic Anger

AI
.472*

CIS
.820**

IRC
.824**

+Partisanship
2
3
4
5
6
7

0.435
-0.176
1.520
2.439*
1.075
2.277*

-0.634
-17.347
2.266
1.452
2.680
0.192

1.143
-0.678
227.249
1.955
1.480
3.666**

++Interaction
Partisanship x Deontic Anger
2
3
4
5
6
7

-0.134
0.169
-0.410
-0.507
-0.209
-0.393

-0.136
-0.682
0.944*
-0.531
1.110**
-0.483

-0.428
-0.201
32.141
-0.472
-0.424
0.845**

Constant

-3.380

-4.755

-4.876

Notes:
Multinomial Logit Regression
n = 543, Pseudo R2 = .099
+

Strong Republican is the base category
Strong Republican x Deontic Anger is the base
category
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
++
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As indicated by Figure 4.3, Strong Democrats were more likely than Strong Republicans
to choose Amnesty International. The effect of deontic anger does not appear to be statistically
significant for either party. Although, approaching the mean deontic anger score for Strong
Republicans, there is a greater change in the likelihood of donating to Amnesty than there is for
Strong Democrats. As with Amnesty, the effect of deontic anger on a Strong Democrats likelihood
of donating to either the Center for Immigration Studies or the International Rescue Committee is
minimal. Although, the slope for Strong Democrats on the International Rescue Committee graph
is slightly negative. This means that as deontic anger increases among Strong Democrats, the
likelihood of donating to this organization decreases. For Strong Republicans on the other hand,
the likelihood of donating to either organization significantly increases as deontic anger increases.
For those who report mean anger and above, the effect is even greater.
Overall, the interactive effect of partisanship and deontic anger on chosen donation
organization is greatest among Strong Republicans. Further, the effect is most evident for those
donating to the International Rescue Committee. As previously stated, the lowest number of
respondents chose the Center for Immigration Studies as their donation organization. For all levels
of deontic anger, the likelihood of a Strong Democrat donating to this organization remained low.
Yet, among Strong Republicans, there was a significant increase as deontic anger increased. Since
this was the conservative option, the results are as expected. For low levels of deontic anger, the
results of the International Rescue Committee are also as expected. Strong Democrats are more
likely than Strong Republicans to donate to this organization. However, as deontic anger increases,
the likelihood of a Strong Republican donating surpasses that of Strong Democrats.
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Figure 4.3: Predicted Probabilities by Organization (Partisanship x Deontic Anger)
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As indicated by Table 4.6, results of a multinomial logistic regression showing the
likelihood of a respondent to visit an organization’s website after donating or visiting and sharing
that website on social media after donating further support the results thus far. Compared to the
base condition of not visiting the organizations website or visiting and sharing the organizations
website, the effect of deontic anger on both the option to visit (b=.290, p=0.000) and to visit and
share (b=.433, p=0.000) are statistically significant (Table 4.6). Table 4.7 and Figure 4.4 show the
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interaction of deontic anger and political party on the decision to visit or visit and share an
organizations website indicates that deontic anger has a significant effect among Strong
Republicans.
Similar to the results choosing a donation organization, deontic anger has a more
significant effect on Strong Republicans than on Strong Democrats. For both options, at the lowest
level of deontic anger, Strong Democrats are more likely than Strong Republicans to choose yes.
However, at approximately the mean level of deontic anger, Strong Republicans surpass Strong
Democrats in the likelihood to choose yes.

Table 4.6: The Effect of Deontic Anger on Website Visitation and Sharing
Yes

Yes and Share

Deontic Anger
Coefficient
Std. Err.

0.290***
0.053

.433***
-4.906

Constant

-2.659

0.667

Notes:
Multinomial Logit Regression
n = 572, Pseudo R2 = .060
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
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Table 4.7: The Effect of Deontic Anger on Website Visitation and Sharing
(Partisanship x Deontic Anger)
Yes
Yes and Share
.824*** 1.160*

Deontic Anger
+Partisanship
2
3
4
5
6
7

-0.100
0.390
-2.838
2.367*
1.706
2.838**

3.311
3.164
-0.590
2.481
2.926
3.805

++Interactions
Partisanship x Deontic Anger
2
3
4
5
6
7

-0.250
-0.034
0.027
-0.614*
-0.599*
-0.772*

-1.053
-0.598
-0.070
-0.739
-0.861
-1.018*

Constant

-4.289

-7.597

Notes:
Multinomial Logit Regression
n = 547, Pseudo R2 = .125
+

Strong Republican is the base category

++

Strong Republican x Deontic Anger is the base category
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
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Figure 4.4: The Effect of Deontic Anger on Website Visitation and Sharing (Partisanship x
Deontic Anger)
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Discussion
Results of the logistic regression support H1. There is a significant relationship between
deontic anger and the likelihood of making a charitable contribution, regardless of condition. As a
respondent’s reported deontic anger increases, so does the likelihood of that respondent making a
charitable contribution. Findings do not support H2, which posits that at equal levels of deontic
anger, Republicans are more likely than Democrats to make a charitable contribution. Overall, at
lower levels of deontic anger, Democrats are more likely than Republicans to make a charitable
donation. For Amnesty International, the likelihood that a Republican will donate to this
organization is never greater than the likelihood that a Democrat will donate to this organization.
For the International Rescue Committee, Democrats are more likely than Republicans to donate to
this organization when reported deontic anger is lower than the approximate mean. Only for the
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Center for Immigration Studies organization (the conservative organization) are Republicans more
likely than Democrats to donate, regardless of deontic anger. As suggested the results for H2, at
lower levels of deontic anger, Democrats are more likely than Republicans to make a charitable
donation. However, for those respondents who score higher than the mean of deontic anger
(mean=3.827, SD=2.213), Republicans are more likely to make a charitable donation than
Democrats. Therefore, at equal levels of deontic anger, Republicans are more likely to make a
charitable donation at higher levels, while Democrats and independents are more likely to make a
charitable donation at lower levels of deontic anger.
Further analysis indicates that the effect of deontic anger is mitigated by partisanship,
which supports H3. While respondents who identify as Republican are consistently motivated by
deontic anger, the effect is negligible among respondents who identify as Democrat.
Conclusion
Overall, the results of this chapter further support the statistical significance of deontic
anger. Just as Chapter 3 established a relationship between deontic anger and individual attitudes
toward immigration related policies, this chapter has established the relationship between deontic
anger and the decision to donate to an immigration related organization. Again, the significance is
consistent across conditions. Interestingly, there is a mitigating effect of partisanship for strong
Democrats. Unlike their Republican counterparts, those who identify as Democrat do not appear
to change their donation behavior as a result of deontic anger. Essentially, a Democrat is just as
likely to donate to chosen organization at higher levels of deontic anger as they are to donate at
lower levels of deontic anger. However, respondents who identify as strong Republicans seem to
be motivated to act on strong feelings of deontic anger. Contrary to Democrats, as deontic anger
increases for a Republican respondent, so does the likelihood of donating to a chosen organization.
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To reiterate the findings, at least in the case of immigration, as deontic anger becomes
stronger among Republicans, they become more likely to donate to a charitable organization that
could potentially benefit perceived victims. As for respondents who identify as Democrat, the
effect of partisanship could be less significant since, per expectations, this group was already more
likely to choose the liberal leaning organization for donation. The control variables moral courage
and welfare chauvinism were not significant in the presented models. However, moral identity did
show marginal significance in the marginal effects model for H3. Used as moderating variables,
the results could be different. Of the standard demographics, only education was significant in any
of the models.
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V: CONCLUSION
Summary
Extant literature in political science suggests that negative emotions play a significant
role in our understanding of how both political attitudes (e.g. Brader 2006) and political behavior
(e.g. Lamprianou and Ellinas 2019; Miller 2011) are motivated. Of the explored negative
emotions, studies suggest that people are especially motivated to act on anger (e.g. Brader 2006).
Evidence also suggests that there are three different types of anger (i.e. personal, empathic, and
deontic) (Batson et al. 2007) that can be provoked in response to the observation of a third-party
being mistreated. However, to date, extant literature utilizing anger as a variable has treated the
emotion in a generic manner. Given that the three types of anger lead to different behavioral
responses, to explore anger as an umbrella emotion is flawed. Thus, the purpose of this
dissertation is to focus specifically on deontic anger, which has, to date, been excluded from
political science literature.
Deontic anger is taken from studies in business literature. As such, Chapter 2 provides
theoretical framework and empirical justification for the inclusion of deontic anger in political
science. The analyses in this chapter examine 1) the direct relationship between an individual’s
perception of third-party behavior as abusive and 2) the moderating role of partisanship in that
relationship. Results of all analyses from Chapter 2 offers significant support for the proposed
hypotheses. Essentially, regardless of framed condition or partisanship, individuals who report
that they perceive the treatment of a third-party to be abusive report higher levels of deontic
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anger than individuals who do not perceive the same condition as abusive. Regarding
partisanship, within the same condition, holding observed abuse constant, Strong Democrats
report higher levels of deontic anger than Strong Republicans. Thus, partisanship does have a
mitigating effect on the relationship between observed abuse and deontic anger; however, the
direct relationship between the two variables is consistently significant.
Building on the results from Chapter 2, the purpose of Chapter 3 is 1) to explore the
extent to which deontic anger directs policy attitudes toward immigration and redistribution and
2) to explore the mitigating effect of partisanship on the relationship between deontic anger and
those policy attitudes. Results of the analyses further support the significance of deontic anger.
There is a direct and positive relationship between deontic anger and support for
liberal/accommodating immigration and redistributive policies. With the exception of the
Ceremony frame, the finding is consistent across conditions. Regarding party strength, Strong
Democrats seem to be supportive of liberal/accommodating policies regardless of deontic anger.
However, with the exception of independents, moving from Strong Democrat to Strong
Republican strengthens the relationship between deontic anger and supporting a
liberal/accommodating immigration or redistributive policy. For independents, as deontic anger
increases, support for liberal/accommodating policies decreases.
The final empirical chapter explores 1) the direct relationship between deontic anger and
charitable giving and 2) the mitigating effect of partisanship on that relationship. As with the
results from the first two empirical chapters, findings support the significance of deontic anger.
There is a significant positive relationship between deontic anger and the likelihood of making a
charitable donation. The mitigating effect of partisanship is related to both the level of reported
deontic anger and the respondent’s party identification. When comparing across the same level
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of deontic anger, the results show Republicans are more likely to make a charitable donation at
higher levels of deontic anger while Democrats and independents are more likely to make a
donation at lower levels of deontic anger.
Overall, the collective results of the analyses support the theoretical premise of this
dissertation. When an individual reports feeling deontic anger in response to the perceived
mistreatment of a third-party, that individual is motivated to act in a way that potentially offers
compensation to that individual. Per the survey experiment conducted for this dissertation, when
an immigrant is perceived to be mistreated, the third-party observer is likely to support
liberal/accommodating immigration and redistributive policies and also to make a charitable
donation to an organization that supports immigration.
Limitations
Despite the consistent significance of deontic anger, this dissertation is not without
limitations. First, although the utilized methodology of a survey experiment is appropriate per
extant literature on measuring emotional responses (e.g. Plutchik and Kellerman 1974; Gross
2008; Iyengar 1991), the design is not flawless. Additionally, space limitations require the
omission of variables that could offer further insight as to who is most affect by deontic anger
and when deontic anger is triggered by immigration related propaganda. As such, the purpose of
the following section is to 1) further address these limitations, and 2) offer avenues by which
these limitations can be addressed in future work.
The use of a survey experiment creates limitations. As stated in Chapter 2, the survey
experiments consist of cross-sectional analysis, meaning individual preferences are only
considered at one point in time. Essentially, the surveys do not have access to the causality of
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information that a time-series analysis would offer. Additionally, neither experiment has the
advantage of an in-depth perspective that would be available through the use of interviews.
Further, controlled episodic frames do not measure responses to real time events. Given the
consistent significance of deontic anger across the analyses, changes to the methodology are not
expected to change that significance. However, variation in the methodology could offer further
insight as to when and how individuals act on deontic anger.
As far as collected data, as suggested in Chapter 4, the donation amount variable is
flawed, and, as such, the collected data is difficult to utilize. Thus, the relationship between
deontic anger and donation amount has not been explored in this dissertation. Further, in Chapter
3, the analysis showing the interactive effect of condition on deontic anger indicated a mitigating
effect of the Ceremony condition. As such, the effect of condition on deontic anger should be
further explored.
As far as omitted variables, this dissertation does not address the effects of race of either
the survey respondent or the immigrant in the episodic frame. In the United States, the racial/ethnic
group that is most likely to be associated with negative immigration stereotypes is Hispanic/Latino
Americans (Brader et al. 2008). In an experiment conducted by Brader et al. (2008), the authors
find that negative news stories about the costs of immigration increase feelings of anger and
anxiety among Americans, with the highest level of anxiety being reported when the news story
depicts Hispanic/Latin American immigrants. This is likely because Hispanic/Latin Americans are
often portrayed by the media as “taking jobs away from Americans” (Reyna et al. 2013, p. 342).
In the context of social identity, when there is an increase in the population percentage of an outgroup (i.e. immigrants) that is believed to receive a disproportionate percentage of redistributive
benefits, the in-group (i.e. Americans) are more likely to express low support for liberal
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redistributive policies. Thus, theoretically, the racial identification of an immigrant and/or the
survey respondent could affect that respondent’s level of deontic anger, as well as how that
respondent behaves in response to feeling deontic anger.
Similarly, whether an individual is considered to be working-class could also affect a
respondent’s level of deontic anger. Nteta (2013) finds evidence that Black Americans, as well as
white Americans, are among those who support restrictive immigration policies, with the least
favorable attitudes among members of the working class. Media coverage addressing the economic
effects of immigrants in the United States often targets working-class Black Americans as
economic victims of immigration (Nteta 2013). Examining the relationship between media
headlines and African American support for immigration reform, Nteta (2013, p. 148) concludes:
Members of the African American working class, more so than their middle-class brethren,
express support for restrictive immigration policies because of the widespread belief that
new immigrants are taking jobs away from working-class African Americans.
Considering the effects of self-interest on political attitudes (e.g. Chong et al. 2001; Citrin
and Green 1990; Crow and Bailey 1995; Green and Gerken 1989; Sears and Citrin 1985; Wolpert
and Gimpel 1998), a reasonable expectation is that those who perceive the greatest realistic threat
from immigration will be the least likely to support liberal immigration policies. The expectation
is not that individuals in this group will report less deontic anger if they perceive that an immigrant
has been abused; it simply means that self-interest will affect the willingness to compensate this
group for experienced injustice.
Future Research
Future research has the potential to both address present limitations and expound on the
findings of this dissertation. Data from an additional survey that was administered on Mechanical
Turk (MTurk) in March 2020 was not utilized in this dissertation. Following the format of
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episodic frames, survey respondents were randomly shown the condition of either quarantine or
detainment. Further, for each condition, the race of the immigrant was randomized as either
Asian, Hispanic, or European. Exploration of this survey data will allow for further
understanding of the effects of both race and condition on deontic anger and the subsequent
behavior when the emotion is triggered.
In the survey utilized for Chapter 4, respondents who chose not to donate to an
organization were then directed to an item asking if they would like to visit a website from which
they could choose to sign an immigration related petition. Including this variable in an analysis
could offer further support for the significant relationship between deontic anger and behavior
that compensates a perceived victim. Additionally, theoretically, the decision of a respondent to
visit a chosen organizations’ website supports extant findings that negative emotions can lead to
information seeking (e.g. Albertson and Kushner Gadarian 2015; Brader et al. 2008). Further
analysis of this variable will strengthen present findings in this dissertation that feelings of
deontic anger prompt an individual to act in a way that benefits a perceived victim of injustice.
Although there are limitations created by allotted space and the chosen methodology, this
dissertation offers a buildable framework. The expectation for future research is that further
exploration of deontic anger will strengthen the present findings.
Conclusion
As stated in the introductory chapter, immigration is a relatively consistent prevalent
political issue that both polarizes and mobilizes voters. The issue can hold such salience that
political leaders, such as Donald Trump, who successfully capitalize on the negative emotions
associated with immigration are victorious in major elections.
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Thus, a specific understanding of how people are affected by individual emotions is important
for predicting how they might respond to emotional appeals as presented by the media.
Theoretically and empirically, each chapter of this dissertation supports the assertion that
deontic anger directs both political attitudes and certain political behavior. In terms of real
support for immigration, political ads that utilize images such as those used in the survey
experiments in this dissertation may be successful in gaining voter support for candidates who
support liberal/accommodating immigration policies. This is especially significant when the
opposing party is using sentiments such as economic worry to mobilize voters.
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APPENDIX A: TREAMENT FRAMES

Ceremony (Low-Abuse)

ICE Raid (Low-Abuse)

Detention Facility (High-Abuse)

Medical Treatment (High-Abuse)
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APPENDIX B: PRE-TEST

Block 2
Each of the following ten scenarios consists of one image and text explaining the context of the image. For each scenario you will
answer four questions. There are no right or wrong answers. You will receive the extra credit for this assignment regardless of your
opinions.

Block 3

The below picture shows Cuban immigrants checking their cell phones inside a migrant shelter in Laredo, Texas. Immigration
officers limited migrants’ cell phone usage to one hour, for security reasons.

135

Are the immigrants in the above scenario being treated fairly?
Yes

No

How do you uncomfortable do you feel about the treatment toward the immigrants?

Consider the treatment of the immigrants in the above scenario. Rate how strongly you feel each of the following emotions.

Not At All

Extremely

Anger

Sa
dn
es
Worry
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Not At All

Extremely

Happines
s

Fear

What is it about the scenario that makes you feel that way?

Block 6
This line of pedestrian travelers is waiting in the U.S. Customs and Border Protection Line at the border between Mexico and
Hidalgo, Texas. The temperature on this day is 95 degrees Fahrenheit, and border patrol has not offered the migrants food or
water as they wait.
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Are the immigrants in the above scenario being treated fairly?
Yes

No

How do you uncomfortable do you feel about the treatment toward the immigrants?

Consider the treatment of the immigrants in the above scenario. Rate how strongly you feel each of the following emotions.
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Not At All
Extremely

Anger

Sadness

Worry

Happiness

Fear

What is it about the scenario that makes you feel that way?

Block 7
The below image captures the moment a mother, her three young children, and her sister surrendered to the United States
border patrol. The family was fleeing Honduras, where both the women and children live in poverty and have limited access
to education. The family sold their minimal possessions to have money once they arrived in the United States. If they are
returned to Honduras, they will all be homeless.

139

Are the immigrants in the above scenario being treated fairly?
Yes

No

How do you uncomfortable do you feel about the treatment toward the immigrants?
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Consider the treatment of the immigrants in the above scenario. Rate how strongly you feel each of the following emotions.

Not At All
Extremely

Anger

Worry

Sadne
ss
Happine
ss
Fear

What is it about the scenario that makes you feel that way?

Block 8
The sixteen-year-old boy in the below image came to the United States to receive medical treatment for cystic fibrosis. The
treatment, which is necessary to alleviate is not offered in his home country, Honduras. The boy, his mother, and his father
were all arrested and detained by Homeland Security at the border between Mexico and California. They will all be returned
to Honduras.
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Are the immigrants in the above scenario being treated fairly?
Yes

No

How do you uncomfortable do you feel about the treatment toward the immigrants?
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Consider the treatment of the immigrants in the above scenario. Rate how strongly you feel each of the following emotions.

Not At All
Extremely

Anger

Sadne
ss
Worry

Happine
ss
Fear

What is it about the scenario that makes you feel that way?

Block 13
These events occurred inside of a U.S. Customs and Border Protection detention facility (Rio Grande Valley Processing
Center in Rio Grande City, TX). Detainees are kept inside fenced areas and children have been separated from their parents.
A seven-minute audio has leaked. Amid the wailing children, a Border Patrol officer is heard saying in Spanish: “Well, we have
an orchestra here. What’s missing is a conductor.”
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Are the immigrants in the above scenario being treated fairly?
Yes

No

How do you uncomfortable do you feel about the treatment toward the immigrants?

Consider the treatment of the immigrants in the above scenario. Rate how strongly you feel each of the following emotions.

Not At All
Extremely
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Anger

Sadn
ess

Worry
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Not At All
Extremely

Happin
ess
Fear

What is it about the scenario that makes you feel that way?

Scenario 6
Are the immigrants in the above scenario being treated fairly?
Yes

No

The below image was taken at a pro-immigration rally in New York City. The protesters want New York City to be a sanctuary
city for illegal immigrants, meaning illegal immigrants will not be arrested and deported while they are in New York City. They
are protesting the federal government's decision that all cities in the Unites States must enforce federal immigration laws.
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How do you uncomfortable do you feel about the treatment toward the immigrants?

Consider the treatment of the immigrants in the above scenario. Rate how strongly you feel each of the following emotions.
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Not At All
Extremely

Anger

Sa
dn
es
Worry

Hap
pine
ss
Fear

What is it about the scenario that makes you feel that way?

Block 17
The below image depicts immigrants who are waiting outside a United States customs office to apply for a green card. Some
of the immigrants are considered low-income, and the green card will allow them to apply for and possibly receive public
benefits such as food stamps.
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Are the immigrants in the above scenario being treated fairly?

149

Yes

No

How do you uncomfortable do you feel about the treatment toward the immigrants?

Consider the treatment of the immigrants in the above scenario. Rate how strongly you feel each of the following emotions.

Not At All
Extremely

Anger

S
a
d
Worry

Ha
ppi
nes
Fear

What is it about the scenario that makes you feel that way?
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Block 19
The below image depicts a naturalization ceremony taking place in Ponoma, California. During the ceremony, immigrants took
an oath to become citizens of the United States. To qualify for the naturalization ceremony, the immigrants were required to
pass a test that was administered in English.
Some of the immigrants entered the United States legally and some entered the United States illegally.
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Are the immigrants in the above scenario being treated fairly?
Yes

No

How do you uncomfortable do you feel about the treatment toward the immigrants?

Consider the treatment of the immigrants in the above scenario. Rate how strongly you feel each of the following emotions.

Not At All
Extremely

Anger

Sadness

Worry

Happiness

Fear

What is it about the scenario that makes you feel that way?
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Block 20
The below image depicts Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents conducting a raid in Richmond, Virginia. The agents
have arrested an illegal immigrant who was hiding in the vehicle.
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Are the immigrants in the above scenario being treated fairly?
Yes

No

How do you uncomfortable do you feel about the treatment toward the immigrants?

Consider the treatment of the immigrants in the above scenario. Rate how strongly you feel each of the following emotions.

Not At All
Extremely
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Anger

Sadness

Worry

Happiness

Fear
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What is it about the scenario that makes you feel that way?

Block 21
The below image depicts three migrants who are trying to cross the Rio Grande and illegally enter the United States. The
migrants are on the Mexican side of the border between Mexico and the United States. The armed officers are members of
the Mexican National Guard.

Are the immigrants in the above scenario being treated fairly?
Yes

No

How do you uncomfortable do you feel about the treatment toward the immigrants?
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Consider the treatment of the immigrants in the above scenario. Rate how strongly you feel each of the following emotions.

Not At All
Extremely

Anger

Sad
nes
s
Worry

157

What is it about the scenario that makes you feel
that way?

Block 14

Your unique code is
7564
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Descriptive Statistics
N

Minimum

Maximum

Mean

Std. Deviation

Frame 1

56

.00

5.00

1.3750

1.64662

Frame 2

38

.00

5.00

2.4763

1.84518

Frame 3

35

.00

5.00

2.3771

1.83601

Frame 4

39

.00

5.00

3.1500

1.74910

Frame 5

37

.00

5.00

3.0068

2.01443

Frame 6

36

.00

5.00

1.6694

1.48017

Frame 7

22

.00

5.00

1.3795

1.76754

Frame 8

23

.00

5.00

1.3928

1.55064

Frame 9

25

.00

5.00

2.1040

2.12367

Frame 10

35

.00

5.00

1.9014

1.81904

Valid N (listwise)

7

Frame 4: Medical Treatment
Frame 5: Detention Center
Frame 8: Naturalization Ceremony
Frame 9: Immigration Raid
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APPENDIX C: EMOTIONS PROFILE INDEX
Measured Emotion

Survey Question
1.

I feel discontented with the immigrants’ treatment

2.

I feel dissatisfied with the immigrants’ treatment

1.

I feel nervous about the immigrants’ treatment

2.

I feel worried about the immigrants’ treatment

3.

I feel tense about the immigrants’ treatment

1.

I feel depressed about the immigrants’ treatment

2.

I feel sad about the immigrants’ treatment

3.

I feel miserable about the immigrants’ treatment

1.

I feel scared about the immigrants’ well-being

2.

I feel afraid about the immigrants’ well-being

3.

I feel panicky about the immigrants’ well-being

1.

I feel embarrassed about the immigrants’ treatment

2.

I feel ashamed about the immigrants’ treatment

3.

I feel humiliated about the immigrants’ treatment

Discontent

Worry

Sad

Fear

Shame
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APPENDIX D: LUCID SURVEY

Lucid Attitudes Survey
Start of Block: Informed Consent

Q176 You are being asked to complete an online research survey that will take approximately 12-15
minutes. This survey is part of a research study conducted by the University of Mississippi. The goal of
this survey is to ask you some questions about yourself and obtain your views about current events and
public policy. Findings from this study may be reported in scholarly journals, at academic seminars,
and at research association meetings. The data will be stored at a secured location and retained
indefinitely. Confidentiality will be maintained to the degree permitted by the technology used. Your
participation in this online survey involves risks similar to a person’s everyday use of the Internet. No
identifying information about you will be made public and any views you express will be kept completely
anonymous. Your participation is voluntary. Even if you decide to participate, you are free not to answer
any question or to withdraw from participation at any time without penalty. There are no known risks
associated with this study beyond those associated with everyday life. Although this study will not
benefit you personally, we hope that our results will add to the knowledge about how different types of
people form their opinions. Note that once you submit responses to the survey the researcher will be
unable to extract your anonymous data from the database if you wish it to be withdrawn. To
participate in the study, you must be at least 18 years old and a U.S. citizen. If you have any questions
about the research, you can contact Jonathan Winburn at jwinburn@olemiss.edu. This study has been
reviewed by The University of Mississippi’s Institutional Review Board (IRB). If you have any questions
about your rights as a research participant or concerns about the conduct of this study, you may contact
The University of Mississippi Office of Research and Sponsored Programs, 100 Barr Hall, University, MS
38677, 662-915-7482, irb@olemiss.edu. *

o I agree to participate and acknowledge that I am 18 years or older
o I do not agree to participate or I am not 18 years or older
End of Block: Informed Consent
Start of Block: Geographic Location NEW
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Q10 In which state do you currently reside?
▼Alabama ... I do not reside in the United States

Q103 What is your zip code?

Please enter your 5-digit zip code only. DOUBLE CHECK TO MAKE SURE IT IS CORRECT!
________________________________________________________________
End of Block: Geographic Location NEW
Start of Block: Moral Courage

Q112 How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statement?
Strongly Disagree
1

When I encounter an ethical challenge I take it on
with moral action, regardless of how it may pose a
negative impact on how others see me
When my job record may be affected negatively, I am
unlikely to get involved in an ethical challenge
I am the type of person who wants to keep things
subdued, not raise issues, or put myself or others in
jeopardy by bringing a moral issue forward

End of Block: Moral Courage
Start of Block: Moral Identity
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2

Strongly Agree
3

4

5

6

7

Q114 Listed below are some characteristics that may describe a person:

Caring, Compassionate, Fair, Friendly, Generous, Hardworking, Helpful, Honest, and Kind

The person with these characteristics could be you, or it could be someone else. For a moment, visualize
in your mind the kind of person who has these characteristics. Imagine how that person would think,
feel, and act. When you have a clear image of what this person would be like, answer the following
questions.
Strongly Disagree
1

2

3

Strongly Agree
4

5

6

7

It would make me feel good to be a person who has
these characteristics
Being someone who has these characteristics is an
important part of who I am
I would not be ashamed to be a person who has these
characteristics
Having these characteristics is really important to me
I strongly desire to have these characteristics

End of Block: Moral Identity
Start of Block: Justice Beliefs

Q116
How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statement?
Strongly Disagree
1
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2

3

Strongly Agree
4

5

6

7

I feel that people get what they deserve
I feel that people who meet with misfortune have
brought it on themselves

End of Block: Justice Beliefs
Start of Block: Welfare Chauvinism

Q118 Thinking of people coming to live in the USA from other countries, when do you think they should
obtain the same rights to social benefits and services as citizens already living here?

o Immediately on arrival
o After living in the USA for one year, whether or not they have worked
o Only after they have worked and paid taxes for at least one year
o Only once they become citizen of the USA
o They should never get the same rights
End of Block: Welfare Chauvinism
Start of Block: Instructions

Q229 You will be shown an image and you will be asked to read a short narrative explaining the image.
You will then answer a short series of questions. Follow the directions for answering each individual
question.

Q230 You will now answer a short series of questions. Follow the directions for answering each
individual question.

End of Block: Instructions
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Start of Block: Scenarios: Images and Text

Q232 The sixteen-year-old boy in the below image came to the United States to receive medical
treatment for cystic fibrosis. The treatment, which is necessary to alleviate pain, is not offered in his
home country, Honduras. The boy, his mother, and his father were all arrested and detained by
Homeland Security at the border between Mexico and California. They will all be returned to Honduras.

Q233 The below image depicts a naturalization ceremony taking place in Ponoma, California. During the
ceremony, immigrants took an oath to become citizens of the United States. To qualify for the
naturalization ceremony, the immigrants were required to pass a test that was administered in English.
Some of the immigrants entered the United States legally, and some entered the United States illegally.

Q234 The below image depicts Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents conducting a raid in
Richmond, Virginia. The agents have arrested an illegal immigrant who was hiding in the vehicle.

Q63 These events occurred inside of a U.S. Customs and Border Protection detention facility (Rio Grande
Valley Processing Center in Rio Grande City, TX). Detainees are kept inside fenced areas, and children
have been separated from their parents. A seven-minute audio has leaked. Amid the wailing children, a
Border Patrol officer is heard saying in Spanish: “Well, we have an orchestra here. What’s missing is a
conductor.”
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Q65 Timing
First Click
Last Click
Page Submit
Click Count

End of Block: Scenarios: Images and Text
Start of Block: Fairness and Emotion

Q255 Are the immigrants in the above scenario being treated fairly?

o Yes
o No
Q256 How uncomfortable does the treatment of the immigrants in the above scenario make you?

o Extremely comfortable
o Moderately comfortable
o Slightly comfortable
o Neither comfortable nor uncomfortable
o Slightly uncomfortable
o Moderately uncomfortable
o Extremely uncomfortable
Page Break
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Q257 Please consider the scenario you just read, and answer the following questions.
Strongly Disagree
1

The immigrants' privacy was not respected
The immigrants were ridiculed
The immigrants were abused
The immigrants were humiliated
The immigrants were not allowed to interact with
each other
The immigrants were made to feel stupid

Page Break
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2

3

Strongly Agree
4

5

6

7

Q258 Please consider the scenario you just read, and answer the following questions.
Strongly Disagree
1

The immigrants' treatment makes me angry
I feel resentful toward the immigrants' treatment
The immigrants' treatment makes me feel irritated

Page Break
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2

3

Strongly Agree
4

5

6

7

Q259 How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statement?
Strongly Disagree
1

If I see that someone is feeling mad because he or she
was mistreated, then I feel mad too
When I see someone feeling sad because he or she
was hurt by another person, I feel angry
I feel angry for other people when they have been
victimized by others
I feel angry for a person when his or her feelings have
been hurt by someone else
I get angry when a friend of mine is hurt by someone
else
When someone I know gets angry at someone else, I
feel angry at that person too
When I see others being taken advantage of, I don't
feel mad for them

Page Break
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2

Strongly Agree
3

4

5

Q260 Please consider the scenario you just read, and answer the following questions.
Strongly Disagree
1

I feel discontented with the immigrants' treatment
I feel dissatisfied with the immigrants' treatment

Page Break
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2

3

Strongly Agree
4

5

6

7

Q261 Please consider the scenario you just read, and answer the following questions.
Strongly Disagree
1

I feel nervous about the immigrants' treatment
I feel worried about the immigrants' treatment
I feel tense about the immigrants' treatment

Page Break
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2

3

Strongly Agree
4

5

6

7

Q262 Please consider the scenario you just read, and answer the following questions.
Strongly Disagree
1

I feel depressed about the immigrants' treatment
I feel sad about the immigrants' treatment
I feel miserable about the immigrants' treatment

Page Break
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2

3

Strongly Agree
4

5

6

7

Q263 Please consider the scenario you just read, and answer the following questions.
Strongly Disagree
1

I feel scared about the immigrants' well-being
I feel afraid about the immigrants' well-being
I feel panicky about the immigrants' well-being

Page Break
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2

3

Strongly Agree
4

5

6

7

Q264 Please consider the scenario you just read, and answer the following questions.
Strongly Disagree
1

I feel embarrassed about the immigrants' treatment
I feel ashamed about the immigrants' treatment
I feel humiliated about the immigrants' treatment

Page Break
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2

3

Strongly Agree
4

5

6

7

End of Block: Fairness and Emotion
Start of Block: Immigration Preferences

Q146 Do you think the number of immigrants from foreign countries who are permitted to come to the
United States to live should be INCREASED, LEFT THE SAME as it is now, or DECREASED?

o Increased
o Left the same
o Decreased
Q148 Would you FAVOR or OPPOSE legislation to increase border security in order to make it more
difficult for individuals to enter the country illegally?

o Favor
o Oppose
Q150 Would you FAVOR or OPPOSE legislation that would allow undocumented immigrants in the
country to apply for legal status?

o Favor
o Oppose
End of Block: Immigration Preferences
Start of Block: Redistributive Preferences
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Q140 How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statement?
Strongly Disagree
1

2

3

Strongly Agree
4

5

6

The government should take measures to reduce
differences in income levels

Q142 How important would you say it is for a person to support people who are worse off than
themselves?

o Extremely important
o Very important
o Moderately important
o Slightly important
o Not at all important
Q144 Please choose one of the following statements:

o We are spending too much money on social security
o We are spending too little money on social security
o We are spending the right amount on social security
End of Block: Redistributive Preferences
Start of Block: Demographics
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7

Q140 Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a …?

o Democrat
o Republican
o Independent
o Other
o Not Sure
Q142 Do you think of yourself as closer to the Democratic or the Republican Party?

o Democratic Party
o Republican Party
o Neither
Q144 Would you call yourself a strong Democrat or a not very strong Democrat?

o Strong
o Not Very Strong
Q146 Would you call yourself a strong Republican or a not very strong Republican?

o Strong
o Not Very Strong
177

Q148 Generally speaking, would you describe your political views as:

o Very Liberal
o Liberal
o Somewhat Liberal
o Middle of the Road
o Somewhat Conservative
o Conservative
o Very Conservative
Q150 How interested are you in politics and current events?

o Very interested
o Somewhat interested
o Not at all interested
Q171 Did you vote in the following elections?
Yes
2016 Presidential Election
2018 Congressional
Elections

No

o
o

o
o
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Don't Know

o
o

Q173 How likely are you to vote in the 2020 Presidential Election this November?

o Very Unlikely
o Unlikely
o Somewhat Unlikely
o Somewhat Likely
o Likely
o Very Likely
End of Block: Demographics
Start of Block: Location Questions NEW

Q275 Which of the following best describes the place where you live

o In open country or on a farm
o In a small town/township/village
o In a small city
o In a medium-size city
o In a suburb near a large city
o In a large city
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Q276 How would you consider the place where you live?

o Very urban
o Somewhat urban
o More urban than rural
o More rural than urban
o Somewhat rural
o Very rural
Q277 Do you live in the community where you grew up?

o Yes
o No
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Q278 How long have you lived in the community where you live now?

o Less than 1 year
o 1 to 5 years
o 6 to 10 years
o 11 to 20 years
o 21 to 30 years
o 31 to 40 years
o More than 50 years
o Don't know
Q279 Did you grow up in the same state that you live in now or a different state?

o Same state
o Different state
Q280 What state did you grow up in?
▼Alabama ... I do not reside in the United States

End of Block: Location Questions NEW
Start of Block: State/City Attachment NEW
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Q281 Please indicate your agreement with the following statements:
Strongly
agree
I feel emotionally attached to
${Q10/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices}

Somewhat
agree

Neither
agree nor
disagree

Somewhat
disagree

Strongly
disagree

I feel loyal to
${Q10/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices}

o
o

o
o

o
o

o
o

o
o

I have loyal obligations to other
people from
${Q10/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices}

o

o

o

o

o

Too much of my life would be
disrupted if I decided to leave
${Q10/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices}

o

o

o

o

o

Page Break

182

Q282 Please indicate your agreement with the following statements:
Strongly
agree

Somewhat
agree

Neither agree
nor disagree

Somewhat
disagree

Strongly
disagree

I feel emotionally
attached to
${e://Field/QCity_Q103}

o

o

o

o

o

I feel loyal to
${e://Field/QCity_Q103}

o

o

o

o

o

I have loyal obligations
to other people from
${e://Field/QCity_Q103}

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

Too much of my life
would be disrupted if I
decided to leave
${e://Field/QCity_Q103}

Page Break
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End of Block: State/City Attachment NEW
Start of Block: Comparisons NEW

Q283 In your best estimation, how does crime in ${e://Field/QCity_Q103} compare to the rest of
${Q10/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices}?

o Lower
o About the same
o Higher

Q284 In your best estimation, how is the economy doing in ${e://Field/QCity_Q103} compared to the
rest of ${Q10/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices}?

o It is doing worse
o About the same
o It is doing better

Q285 In your best estimation, how does the political ideology of most people in
${e://Field/QCity_Q103} compare to the rest of ${Q10/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices}?

o More conservative
o About the same as the rest of the state
o More liberal
End of Block: Comparisons NEW
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Start of Block: Representation NEW

Q286 How much do you agree with the following statement:
The state government in ${lm://Field/2} represents my interests?

o Strongly agree
o Somewhat agree
o Neither agree nor disagree
o Somewhat disagree
o Strongly disagree
Q287 How much do you think your state government in ${lm://Field/2} cares about
${e://Field/QCity_Q103} compared to other areas of the state?

o Much more about my area than other areas of the state
o Somewhat more about my area than other areas of the state
o About the same amount
o Somewhat less about my area than other areas of the state
o Much less about my area than other ares of the state
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Q288 How much of the time do you think you can trust the state government in ${lm://Field/2} to do
what is right?

o Just about always
o Most of the time
o Only some of the time
o Never
End of Block: Representation NEW
Start of Block: Political Questions NEW

Q289 Think about the state government in ${Q10/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices}.
Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements:
Strongly
agree
I am satisfied with the state
government in
${Q10/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices}.
The political decisions made by the
state government in
${Q10/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices}
has an impact on my life.
I pay attention to politics in
${Q10/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices}.

Somewhat
agree

Neither
agree nor
disagree

Somewhat
disagree

Strongly
disagree

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

Page Break
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Q290 Think about the local government in ${e://Field/QCity_Q103}.
Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements:
Strongly
agree
I am satisfied with the
local government in
${e://Field/QCity_Q103}.
The political decisions
made by the local
government in
${e://Field/QCity_Q103}
has an impact on my life.
I pay attention to politics
in
${e://Field/QCity_Q103}.

Somewhat
agree

Neither agree
nor disagree

Somewhat
disagree

Strongly
disagree

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

Page Break
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Q291 Think about the federal government in Washington D.C.
Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements:
Strongly agree
I am satisfied
with the federal
government in
Washington
D.C.
The political
decisions made
by the federal
government in
Washington
D.C. has an
impact on my
life.
I pay attention
to politics in
Washington
D.C.

Somewhat
agree

Neither agree
nor disagree

Somewhat
disagree

Strongly
disagree

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

Page Break
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End of Block: Political Questions NEW
Start of Block: Governor

Q62 How much do you approve of the job Governor ${lm://Field/2} is currently doing in your state?

o Strongly approve
o Somewhat approve
o Neither approve nor disapprove
o Somewhat disapprove
o Strongly disapprove
Q63 How much do you approve of the job Governor ${lm://Field/2} (${lm://Field/3}) is currently doing
in your state?

o Strongly approve
o Somewhat approve
o Neither approve nor disapprove
o Somewhat disapprove
o Strongly disapprove
End of Block: Governor
Start of Block: Travel Questions NEW
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Q292 Please answer the following question about: ${lm://Field/2}.
Which option best describes your experience?

o Have lived/currently live in the city
o Have lived/currently live in the city's metro area
o Visit the city frequently
o Visit the city occasionally
o Visit the city rarely
o Have never been to the city
End of Block: Travel Questions NEW
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APPENDIX E: MECHANICAL TURK SURVEY

Behavioral Responses - MTurk Final
Start of Block: Informed Consent

You are being asked to complete an online research survey that will take approximately 5-7 minutes.
This survey is part of a research study conducted by the University of Mississippi. The goal of this survey
is to ask you some questions about yourself and obtain your views about current events and public
policy. Findings from this study may be reported in scholarly journals, at academic seminars, and at
research association meetings. The data will be stored at a secured location and retained indefinitely.
Confidentiality will be maintained to the degree permitted by the technology used. Your participation in
this online survey involves risks similar to a person’s everyday use of the Internet. No identifying
information about you will be made public and any views you express will be kept completely
anonymous. Your participation is voluntary. Even if you decide to participate, you are free not to answer
any question or to withdraw from participation at any time without penalty. There are no known risks
associated with this study beyond those associated with everyday life. Although this study will not
benefit you personally, we hope that our results will add to the knowledge about how different types of
people form their opinions. Note that once you submit responses to the survey the researcher will be
unable to extract your anonymous data from the database if you wish it to be withdrawn. To
participate in the study, you must be at least 18 years old and a U.S. citizen. If you have any questions
about the research, you can contact Jonathan Winburn at jwinburn@olemiss.edu. This study has been
reviewed by The University of Mississippi’s Institutional Review Board (IRB). If you have any questions
about your rights as a research participant or concerns about the conduct of this study, you may contact
The University of Mississippi Office of Research and Sponsored Programs, 100 Barr Hall, University, MS
38677, 662-915-7482, irb@olemiss.edu. *

o I agree to participate and acknowledge that I am 18 years or older
o I do not agree to participate or I am not 18 years or older
End of Block: Informed Consent
Start of Block: Demographics
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What is your zip code?
________________________________________________________________

What is your gender?

o Male
o Female
o Other/Not Listed
What racial or ethnic group or groups best describes you (select all that apply)?
White
Black
Hispanic
Asian
Native American
Pacific Islander
Other
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Last year, what was your total household income before taxes, from all sources?

o Under 20,000 dollars
o 20-35,000 dollars
o 35-50,000 dollars
o 50-75,000 dollars
o 75-100,000 dollars
o 100,000 or more dollars
o Refuse to answer
What year were you born?
▼2000 ... 1900
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What is the highest level of education you have completed?

o Less than High School
o High School / GED
o Some College
o 2-year College Degree
o 4-year College Degree
o Masters Degree
o Doctoral Degree
o Professional Degree (JD, MD)
Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a …?

o Democrat
o Republican
o Independent
o Other
o Not Sure
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Do you think of yourself as closer to the Democratic or the Republican Party?

o Democratic Party
o Republican Party
o Neither
Would you call yourself a strong Democrat or a not very strong Democrat?

o Strong
o Not Very Strong
Would you call yourself a strong Republican or a not very strong Republican?

o Strong
o Not Very Strong
Page Break
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Generally speaking, would you describe your political views as:

o Very Liberal
o Liberal
o Somewhat Liberal
o Middle of the Road
o Somewhat Conservative
o Conservative
o Very Conservative
How interested are you in politics and current events?

o Very interested
o Somewhat interested
o Not at all interested
Did you vote in the following elections?
Yes
2016 Presidential Election
2018 Congressional
Elections

No

o
o

o
o
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Don't Know

o
o

How likely are you to vote in the 2020 Presidential Election this November?

o Very Unlikely
o Unlikely
o Somewhat Unlikely
o Somewhat Likely
o Likely
o Very Likely
End of Block: Demographics
Start of Block: Citizenship and Identity

Are you a natural born citizen of the United States?

o Yes
o No
How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statements?
Strongly Disagree
1

I think of myself primarily as an American and seldom
as a member of an ethnic or racial group

End of Block: Citizenship and Identity
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2

3

Strongly agree
4

5

6

7

Start of Block: Welfare Chauvinism

Thinking of people coming to live in the USA from other countries, when do you think they should obtain
the same rights to social benefits and services as citizens already living here?

o Immediately on arrival
o After living in the USA for one year, whether or not they have worked
o Only after they have worked and paid taxes for at least one year
o Only once they become citizen of the USA
o They should never get the same rights
End of Block: Welfare Chauvinism
Start of Block: Moral Courage

How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statements?
Strongly Disagree
1

When I encounter an ethical challenge I take it on
with moral action, regardless of how it may pose a
negative impact on how others see me
When my job record may be affected negatively, I am
unlikely to get involved in an ethical challenge
I am the type of person who wants to keep things
subdued, not raise issues, or put myself or others in
jeopardy by bringing a moral issue forward

End of Block: Moral Courage
Start of Block: Moral Identity
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2

3

Strongly Agree
4

5

6

7

Listed below are some characteristics that may describe a person:

Caring, Compassionate, Fair, Friendly, Generous, Hardworking, Helpful, Honest, and Kind

The person with these characteristics could be you, or it could be someone else. For a moment, visualize
in your mind the kind of person who has these characteristics. Imagine how that person would think,
feel, and act. When you have a clear image of what this person would be like, answer the following
questions.
Strongly Disagree
1

2

3

Strongly Agree
4

5

6

7

It would make me feel good to be a person who has
these characteristics
Being someone who has these characteristics is an
important part of who I am
I would not be ashamed to be a person who has these
characteristics
Having these characteristics is really important to me
I strongly desire to have these characteristics

End of Block: Moral Identity
Start of Block: Justice Beliefs

How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

Strongly Disagree
1
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2

3

Strongly Agree
4

5

6

7

I feel that people get what they deserve
I feel that people who meet with misfortune have
brought it on themselves

End of Block: Justice Beliefs
Start of Block: Instructions

You will be shown an image and you will be asked to read a short narrative explaining the image. You
will then answer a short series of questions. Follow the directions for answering each individual
question.

You will now answer a short series of questions. Follow the directions for answering each individual
question.

End of Block: Instructions
Start of Block: Images and Narrative Text

These events occurred inside of a U.S. Customs and Border Protection detention facility (Rio Grande
Valley Processing Center in Rio Grande City, TX). Detainees are kept inside fenced areas, and children
have been separated from their parents. A seven-minute audio has leaked. Amid the wailing children, a
Border Patrol officer is heard saying in Spanish: “Well, we have an orchestra here. What’s missing is a
conductor.”

The sixteen-year-old boy in the below image came to the United States to receive medical treatment for
cystic fibrosis. The treatment, which is necessary to alleviate pain, is not offered in his home country,
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Honduras. The boy, his mother, and his father were all arrested and detained by Homeland Security at
the border between Mexico and California. They will all be returned to Honduras.

The below image depicts a naturalization ceremony taking place in Ponoma, California. During the
ceremony, immigrants took an oath to become citizens of the United States. To qualify for the
naturalization ceremony, the immigrants were required to pass a test that was administered in English.
Some of the immigrants entered the United States legally, and some entered the United States illegally.

The below image depicts Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents conducting a raid in Richmond,
Virginia. The agents have arrested an illegal immigrant who was hiding in the vehicle.

End of Block: Images and Narrative Text
Start of Block: Fairness and Anger

Are the immigrants in the above scenario being treated fairly?

o Yes
o No
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How uncomfortable does the treatment of the immigrants in the above scenario make you?

o Extremely comfortable
o Moderately comfortable
o Slightly comfortable
o Neither comfortable nor uncomfortable
o Slightly uncomfortable
o Moderately uncomfortable
o Extremely uncomfortable
Please consider the scenario you just read, and answer the following questions.
Strongly Disagree
1

The immigrants' privacy was not respected
The immigrants were ridiculed
The immigrants were abused
The immigrants were humiliated
The immigrants were not allowed to interact with
each other
The immigrants were made to feel stupid
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2

3

Strongly Agree
4

5

6

7

Please consider the scenario you just read and answer the following questions.
Strongly Disagree
1

2

3

Strongly Agree
4

5

6

7

The immigrants' treatment makes me angry
I feel resentful toward the immigrants' treatment
The immigrants' treatment makes me feel irritated

End of Block: Fairness and Anger
Start of Block: Empathic Anger

How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statements?
Strongly Disagree
1

If I see that someone is feeling mad because he or she
was mistreated, then I feel mad too
When I see someone feeling sad because he or she
was hurt by another person, I feel angry
I feel angry for other people when they have been
victimized by others
I feel angry for a person when his or her feelings have
been hurt by someone else
I get angry when a friend of mine is hurt by someone
else
When someone I know gets angry at someone else, I
feel angry at that person too
When I see others being taken advantage of, I don't
feel mad for them
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2

Strongly Agree
3

4

5

End of Block: Empathic Anger
Start of Block: Donation

You will be receiving compensation in the amount of $0.25 along with a bonus amount of $0.25.
Consider whether you would like to donate any portion of your bonus amount to ONE of the following
organizations. The researchers will make a private donation to each organization upon completion of
this project.

Please select ONE of the following options, AND ALSO enter the amount that you would like to donate.

o Amnesty International (a non-profit, non-partisan organization that supports human rights)
________________________________________________

o Center for Immigration Studies (an immigration organization that promotes a low-immigration
vision) ________________________________________________

o International Rescue Committee (an immigration organization that promotes the resettlement
of refugees) ________________________________________________

o I would NOT like to donate any portion of my bonus amount of $0.25
End of Block: Donation
Start of Block: Behavioral Assessment

Would you like to visit Amnesty International's website to learn more about current immigration issues?

Please choose one of the following.
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The selected website link will open in a new window. Please make sure to complete the survey so that
you will receive your compensation.

o No. I would not like to visit Amnesty International's website.
o Yes. I would like to visit Amnesty International's website.
o Yes. I would like to visit Amnesty International's website, and I will also share the website on
social media.

When you are finished looking over the website, please make sure to come back to this page and click
the "Next" button to finish the survey and get your completion code.

Timing
First Click
Last Click
Page Submit
Click Count

Would you like to visit a website where you can choose to sign one or more petitions that encourage a
change in the conditions of incoming immigrants to the United States?

Please choose one of the following.
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The selected website link will open in a new window. Please make sure to complete the survey so that
you will receive your compensation.

o No. I do not want to sign a petition.
o Yes. I would like to sign one or more petitions.
o Yes. I would like to sign one or more petitions, and I will also share the petition(s) on social
media.

When you are finished looking over the website, please make sure to come back to this page and click
the "Next" button to finish the survey and get your completion code.

Timing
First Click
Last Click
Page Submit
Click Count

Would you like to visit the International Rescue Committee's website to learn more about current
immigration issues?

Please choose one of the following.
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The selected website link will open in a new window. Please make sure to complete the survey so that
you will receive your compensation.

o No. I would not like to visit the International Rescue Committee's website.
o Yes. I would like to visit the International Rescue Committee's website.
o Yes. I would like to visit the International Rescue Committee's website, and I will also share the
website on social media.

When you are finished looking over the website, please make sure to come back to this page and click
the "Next" button to finish the survey and get your completion code.

Timing
First Click
Last Click
Page Submit
Click Count

Would you like to visit the Center for Immigration Studies' website to learn more about current
immigration issues?

Please choose one of the following.
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The selected website link will open in a new window. Please make sure to complete the survey so that
you will receive your compensation.

o No. I would not like to visit the Center for Immigration Studies' website.
o Yes. I would like to visit the Center for Immigration Studies' website.
o Yes. I would like to visit the Center for Immigration Studies' website, and I will also share the
website on social media.

When you are finished looking over the website, please make sure to come back to this page and click
the "Next" button to finish the survey and get your completion code.

Timing
First Click
Last Click
Page Submit
Click Count

End of Block: Behavioral Assessment
Start of Block: Final MTurk

Please let us know if you have any comments or feedback.
________________________________________________________________

Thank you for completing the survey!
Please enter the following code into MTurk to get payment:
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${e://Field/ResponseID}
Please hit the submit button ">>" to make sure you get your payment!

End of Block: Final MTurk
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